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  Anyone who listens to a Walkman while sitting in a subway or jogging through 
  the  park is straddling two worlds. Traveling and jogging are Apollonian  
  activities; listening to music is Dionysian. (Safranski 2002, p. 101) 
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Prologue 
 
 Since I was young, I have always known an intense curiosity for technology, and 
especially computers. This curiosity however, did not seem to be a “healthy interest” at all 
times; I have also felt the powerful traction which seemed to draw me out of boring real 
life and into this semi-magical world, with its seemingly own ontological ground and rules, 
to the point that I would forget “real life” existed at all. Technology is interesting and 
exciting; we live in a time where the nerd is actually attractive. This attractiveness has 
everything to do with the semi-magical world that technology offers us access to. People 
who are better able to “connect”, for instance, are people who have better access to 
opportunities and knowledge of far away places, and who are, per definition, more 
successful. We look down on people who do not have access to education (either in 
disgust or pity), since they clearly do not have the same means to “connect” to a bigger 
world as we do.  
 However true this might be, most of us do not even know how the sending of e-
mail works. To be sure, we know how to send an e-mail, but the actual transmission occurs 
“somewhere” and “somehow”. The further we advance into the technological world, the 
more we realize that technology is a big black box. I dare to claim that most people, who 
are so capable of using and implementing all forms of technology, do not know the exact 
relationship between the “real” and concrete world on the one hand and the digital 
rendering of that world on the other. This thesis is an investigation into that relationship, 
which is so aptly called enframing by Martin Heidegger.  
 This thesis can be seen as an exploration of “computer language”, not from a 
technical point of view, but from a human existential point of view. Enframing is a concept 
which not only refers to a certain frame within which “magical reality occurs”, but also 
refers to our own continual efforts to strengthen our presence within that frame. In other 
words, we strive to be part of the frame, because the magic within the frame of the 
technological world seems so much more meaningful than the boring world of our past. In 
this thesis, we will see that this enframing is not without its problems. 
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Modernity and Technological Functionality 
 
 In today's society, we are confronted with modernity in every corner of our more or 
less globalized civilization. Some refer to our time as post-modern, which signifies a time 
after modernity, yet harbors this reference to a modern era. What is this modernity people 
speak of? Is it some age which is given to us because of the natural development of time 
or is it some sort of concept of fashion? For example, the renaissance is the era following 
the middle ages. But the renaissance is not called the post-medieval time; it is called re-
naissance, though it also refers to a rebirth of some older time. Of course, historically, the 
renaissance is an era which comes after (post) the middle ages. Yet, modernity and post-
modernity seem to take a different direction because post-modernity does not have a new 
name for a new time. Modernity is perhaps the epoch where we finally came to some clos-
ing point in history, because even in our description of times after modernity, we still refer 
to modernity. To understand better why modernity is such a distinct time, it becomes es-
sential to analyze one of the greatest events of modernity. It might not surprise the reader 
that one of the greatest events of our time would be World War II. What is so interesting 
about World War II is the fact that, during the Nazi regime, (as Heidegger says) everything 
‘functioned’ (Heidegger 1966, p.10). This means that not only machines functioned, but a 
human's primary task was to function through the organization of the system. “Everything 
functions and the functioning drives us further and further to more functioning, and tech-
nology tears people away and uproots them from the earth more and more. […] We don't 
need an atom bomb at all; the uprooting of human beings is already taking place. Moder-
nity seems to be a time in which we only have purely technological conditions left. It is no 
longer an earth on which human beings live today.” (Heidegger 1966, p. 10) This quote by 
Heidegger refers to the root of the problem of modernity. The problem is that everything 
is expected to function in terms of a technological framework. As the core of our modern 
and technological era, Heidegger calls this structuring enframing (Das Gestell). So, as a 
German citizen during the Nazi regime, you were expected to help the great nation to win 
the war: you were called upon to be a tool in the name of the greater national socialist 
system. We all know what the consequences of this uprooting were. So, the reason why 
we cannot escape the designation “modern” is because we cannot escape the function of 
enframing in our time: we are not able to escape functioning as main frame. Thus, when we 
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speak about modernity, we speak about a frame of functions as the main frame. 
 The utmost astonishing fact about World War II is that there were people who ap-
parently “just” accepted this regime and fell in line with its way of thinking. In other words, 
what is astonishing is that people let themselves be used – (en)framed – primarily as in-
struments in such an extreme and far-reaching way. Although this technological frame 
might be the essence of our modern time, it cannot explain how people were “convinced” 
to act so blindly. Perhaps the fastest answer to this question is that people are always ea-
ger to gain power and that the road to gaining power during the Nazi regime was very 
clear cut.  
 Of course, this “ethical blindness” is not something everyone shares. Even (or espe-
cially?) at one of the most well-known and influential technological companies of our time, 
Google, there exist a different voice. Damon Horowitz, director of Engineering at Google, 
also has a Ph. D. in philosophy. He illustrates how uncanny our technological era actually is: 
“We have stronger opinions about our handheld devices than about the moral framework 
we should use to guide our decisions.” (article at Venturebeat.com) He further argues that, 
“Technologists need a “moral operating system”. In this thesis we will find that the main 
reason for Horowitz's need for a moral operating system resembles Heidegger's redefini-
tion of thinking almost completely. Horowitz argues, following thinkers like Hannah Ar-
endt, “that most of the evil in the world comes not from bad intentions, but rather from 
“not thinking.” (idem). Yet, one cannot argue that technologists do not think, at least not 
when following the traditional definition of rational and structured (enframing) thinking. 
The main problem, according to Horowitz, is a problem of power: “That [thinking about 
the ethical nature of your decisions, KP] is the first step towards taking responsibility to-
wards what we should do with all of our power,” Horowitz said, later adding, “We have so 
much power today. It is up to us to figure out what to do.” (idem).  
 Another influential figure in philosophy and technological thinking, Douglas R. Hof-
stadter, writes about “Thinking in a new Perspective” (Hofstadter 1985, p. 390). His mean-
ing of this new thinking however, focuses heavily on (artificial) intelligence and scientific 
analysis. Although I would not like to get trapped in the rhetoric about this definition of 
thinking here, it seems to exist in contrast to Heidegger's and Horowitz's definition of 
thinking, which is, at the least, remarkable. This contrast, which seems unbridgeable at 
times, is what makes the question concerning how we enframe our world and how our 
world is enframed, rather urgent, especially on account of the extreme speed of our scien-
tific and technological progress. 
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1.2 The Problem of Our Time: Enframing 
 
So far we have seen that modernity is heavily defined by the act of enframing. Its epitome, 
perhaps, can be found in World War II, when people were seen as instruments to purify 
the earth, in order to achieve a cleaner and more divine humanity. We currently live in a 
time we generally consider more developed and better than any time before us, yet we 
have many global problems we cannot solve technologically. The technological world view 
and its presuppositions seem to lack solutions for human problems. Still humans try to 
solve mostly everything in a technological way. What do we need to understand this para-
dox more deeply and correctly? First of all we need to understand what the poser of this 
problem, Heidegger, actually means by technological enframing. Secondly, Heidegger 
seems to believe “only a god can save us now”. It seems reasonable then to analyze the 
views of a religious thinker, who is, next to being religious, generally called the father of 
existentialism and was one of the main “educators” of Heidegger, Kierkegaard. I will ana-
lyze Kierkegaard's religious-existentialist writing to find out whether or not he has an an-
swer to Heidegger's call for a god. By moving away from metaphysics (and Kierkegaard) 
towards original philosophy (as Heidegger would say), it might be that Heidegger’s God 
has been present all along in Kierkegaard’s writing. Next to this, Kierkegaard's main work 
(Either/Or) seems to be the prelude to a digital era: a world in which the only answers are 
either 1 (on) or 0 (off). Thirdly, it would be interesting to see whether Heidegger was in-
deed the first to pose the problem of technological enframing. Is he the one we should 
look to for the original answer to his own question? According to Nietzsche, this is not the 
case at all. “An unlimited will to knowledge poses a grave threat. This is a fact only a few 
have understood.” (Nietzsche 1980, VII.2:181). This quote already points to the threat of 
the “will to knowledge”, which is nothing other than a technological will to enframe reality. 
An analysis of Nietzsche therefore, shall add a further dimension. From a meta-point of 
view moreover, there are also reasons to bridge Kierkegaard and Heidegger by means of 
Nietzsche's philosophy. I will go into these arguments after the main question of this the-
sis (in meta-question) has been posed. 
 Furthermore, I would like to pose the question of how enframing works today. We 
obviously live in a digitalized world, in which networking continues to gain importance. 
This networking is often done via the internet. A number of social media communities (Fa-
cebook, Twitter, LinkedIn and Google+, to name a few) are widely popular today. Yet, 
should we speak of communities in this digital sense? Does technological enframing pro-
vide us with new ways of relating to one another? Or could we say that enframing detach-
13 
es us from the world around us in favor of an imaginary world far away, on the Internet?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A lot has been written about Heidegger, Nietzsche and Kierkegaard and their relationship. 
Gregory B Smith explains Nietzsche's and Heidegger's writings in terms of a transition 
from modernism to post-modernism. One of his questions is whether modernity is unend-
ing or whether there truly is a movement towards post-modernity (Smith 1996, p. 282). 
Perhaps post-modernity is something theoretical, while modernity (praxis) will always be 
characterized by enframing, thoughtless (in Heidegger's and Horowitz's definition) 
tendencies. In that case, theory might not have a very concrete influence in the practical 
realm.  
 One of the most essential questions about the relationship between Heidegger and 
Nietzsche is raised in the book “The will to technology and the culture of nihilism: 
Heidegger, Nietzsche and Marx” by Arthur Kroker. He puts it very aptly when he says, “No 
longer coded by the language of polarities, is it possible that today art and technology re-
veal traces of a more ancient relationship, traces of the broken spiral of techne and poiesis 
the absence of which haunted the writing of Nietzsche and Heidegger […]. Against the 
will to technology, which is increasingly hygienic, art introduces a counter-praxis of 
smeared images, smudged bodies, and contaminated optics […]. As poiesis, art literally 
overexposes the always hidden language of power.” (Kroker 2004, p. 157). The 
Heideggerian concepts of poiesis and techne will be explained in this thesis. The question 
remains however, whether or not art is subject to the same hidden language of power. If 
art and technology are “no longer coded by the language of polarities”, how can it be so 
that these polarities (for instance “art” versus “science”) still seem to have such a power in 
our current age? I believe that Kierkegaard's concept of repentance as well as Nietzsche's 
“eternal suspicion” can shed light on enframing in a new and essential way. It is my goal to 
let the trinity of Kierkegaard, Nietzsche and Heidegger reveal a part of the “ancient” es-
sence of the relationship between technology and art and thus why we, in our current age, 
are not at all that developed and progressed as we believe. 
Main problem 
 
The main concern addressed in this thesis is about how we could come to a better 
understanding of the problem of enframing, which Heidegger articulated as the essential 
determinant of modernity, by researching the perspective of early-existential thinkers 
Kierkegaard and Nietzsche.  
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1.3 Meta-question 
 
 An important part of any writing, in my view, is the meta-question. Meta traditional-
ly means “after” or “behind”. In the sense of a meta-question, I therefore ask the question 
behind the question: what kind of change can a writing (like this one) intend to achieve? In 
other words, what does a philosophical exploration about the problem of technology in 
modernity change in our real, daily use or view of technology? According to Heidegger, the 
answer to this question will be: nothing or almost nothing. “Philosophy will not be able to 
bring about a direct change of the present state of the world.” Yet, a sentence later he 
continues, “This is true not only of philosophy but of all merely human meditations and 
endeavors. Only a god can still save us.” (Heidegger 1966, p. 11) Of course, we saw the 
extreme results of technological instrumentality in World War II. Yet, apparently, 
Heidegger feels that human beings cannot even solve their own problems themselves. For 
Heidegger, where there are only human beings, nihilism is in charge. But, do we really 
need a god in order to be saved? It seems like a very pessimistic approach to the problem 
of technological enframing. As the interviewer from Der Spiegel justly told Heidegger, 
“We understand that very well. But […] we are denied silence. We, politicians, semi-
politicians, citizens, journalists, etcetera; we constantly have to make some sort of decision 
or other. We must adapt ourselves to the system under which we live, must try to change 
it, must watch for the narrow door to reform and for the still narrower door to revolution. 
We expect help from the philosopher, even if, of course, only indirect help, help in round-
about ways.” (Heidegger 1966, p. 13) This tension between a constant need to make deci-
sions and the inability to change something in reality with those decisions, is clearly ex-
pressed by Kierkegaard in his concept of Either/Or. One of the important differences be-
tween Kierkegaard and Heidegger seems to be that Kierkegaard is primarily a religious 
(Christian) writer, while Heidegger intends to break with “former” metaphysical think-
ing(and thus also traditional religious thinking, it would seem). To form a bridge between 
Kierkegaard's (metaphysical) thinking and Heidegger's, Nietzsche is central. First of all, 
Nietzsche is also very suspicious about metaphysical and religious thinking, so we might be 
led to believe that Nietzsche and Heidegger are in agreement on the subject of metaphys-
ics. Yet, as it appears, Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche is not very flattering either. 
This is why Nietzsche can be seen as a core figure between Kierkegaard's metaphysical 
thinking and Heidegger's existential thinking. By using Nietzsche as the bridge between 
Kierkegaard and Heidegger, I intend to make the nuances of their thinking as clear as pos-
sible. Also, I intend to make clear the demarcation between a metaphysical and modern 
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(technological) era. 
 So let us look at our society in our modern era. We are people who are always con-
nected to each other by means of (1) technological innovation. We live in a time where 
there are significant doubts about (2) the ecological sustainability of our planet. Next to 
this there is the problem of (3) terrorism and, perhaps the most telling, the problem of the 
(4) financial crisis. Without reducing all these problems (including (1), the problem of un-
checked technological innovation) to a single root, I would argue that (as a general state-
ment) the role of technological advancement in all these cases is very evident. Heidegger 
would summarize this advancement as the problem of technological enframing or the 
technological construct. Saying this, technological enframing is not a problem of Nazism, 
nor is it a problem of technological connectedness, ecological sustainability, terrorism or 
the financial crisis. Rather, the problem of technological enframing is a problem of moder-
nity as such; when we talk about modernity, we talk about technology. Technology is fun-
damental in our experience of the world in our modern time, “The experience that humans 
are structured [enframed, KP], claimed, and challenged by a power that is revealed in the 
essence of technology.” (Heidegger 1966, p. 11). 
 
1.4 Structure of this Thesis 
 
 This thesis has been built around three fragments. In the first part I will analyze 
Kierkegaard's thinking, as expressed in his magnus opus Either/Or. Kierkegaard divided his 
book into two parts, written using different pseudonyms. The first part of the book is writ-
ten by A and focuses heavily on an aesthetic analysis of a metaphysical world view. This 
metaphysical world view returns in my analysis of A's various concepts. Choice, music, de-
sire, tragedy and repentance are aesthetic-metaphysical concepts which capture Kierke-
gaard's early existential mood. Enframing permeates these concepts as the source of a 
constant tragic conflict between an either and an or. What this means is that people are 
always forced to choose for the better of two options, which is tragic because it is a choice 
which is demanded, instead of authentically made. The second part of Either/Or is written 
by B, who heavily criticizes A's tragic and contemplative view on life. B argues for (religious) 
acceptance of the conflict of life, yet he also adds something very important to the con-
cept of enframing, namely a concept called repentance. The conclusion of the first part 
will analyze this addendum. 
 The second part of this thesis is the bridge between Kierkegaard and Heidegger 
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using Nietzsche. Nietzsche, the final metaphysician, is important because of his extreme 
suspicion of philosophy and religion alike. In this second part, we find a critique and inter-
pretation of metaphysics in contrast to an artistic interpretation. Kierkegaard's view on 
music is mainly a metaphysical contemplation, while Nietzsche's idea of music and the arts 
could play an important role in society, since it returns something to life which religion 
always denied. Just as Kierkegaard adds something to the concept of enframing, Nie-
tzsche adds something to metaphysics, through which the entirety of the metaphysical 
system is turned upside down. In this way, Nietzsche revives a long lost life force inside 
thinking, which eventually leads to a deepening of the concept of enframing. 
 I will analyze Heidegger's critique on Nietzsche in the final part of this thesis, after 
which I will reveal Heidegger's own concept of enframing, which he discovered because of 
his research on truth (alètheia). This redefining of truth (as an aesthetic concept) appears 
to be an alternative to scientific enframing.  
 Conclusively, I will add Kierkegaard's and Nietzsche's contributions to achieve a 
more complete understanding of the concept of enframing. This new concept of enfram-
ing shows its face in science as well as the arts. Finally, I will explore whether enframing is 
inescapable or whether our modern world offers us any alternatives to a perspective of 
(ecological) sustainability. In short, technology would demand unlimited resources from 
our ecological environment, but perhaps there are alternatives. 
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2. Immense Aesthetics 
 
 
 
 
 As I explained in the introduction, Kierkegaard's main work Either/Or is divided into 
two parts. In this chapter, I will interpret the first part of Kierkegaard's book, which is his 
aesthetic philosophy. The aesthetic concepts he uses originate from a metaphysical world 
view, in which the world is a cruel place. This cruelty comes from the demanding Either/Or 
life, where according to A, there is always a demand for either this or that. This demand for 
either this or that, I feel, is the way in which enframing works; it does not leave us a real 
choice, because actually, a forced choice is no choice at all. This chapter will explore the 
relationship between the Either/Or choice and enframing more clearly, before continuing 
with an analysis of the second (ethical) part of Kierkegaard’s work. 
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2.1 The Eternal Conflict of Choice 
 
 Kierkegaard's Either/Or signifies an always present, internal conflict of life. 
Often, life demands a choice from us, for either this or that. This demand is omni-
present in such a way that, most of the time, we do not realize we are making choices 
at all. Kierkegaard believes it is necessary to be contemplative and suspicious about 
this constant demand to choose. This contemplation however, does not come easy, 
since eventually we will still not be able to escape making Either/Or choices. Life 
forces us to choose, according to A, and this is essentially tragic because there is no 
way to escape it. Human beings are thus only able to relate to enframing in a tragic 
and inescapable way, A would say. 
 Everything A  does and everything he ever wants originate from his idea of beauty. 
For him, the most beautiful moments in life are always accompanied by death, since they 
necessarily end (Kierkegaard 1843, p. 28). Paradoxes like this (death and beauty) are 
always present. He even claims contradictions are necessary to achieve a certain goal. 
Because of this, A  writes purposefully in a very convoluted and conflicted way. He feels a 
world view should speak for itself, rather than try to convince people (Kierkegaard 1843, p. 
21) and since he believes life is conflicted, he also writes down his world view in a 
conflicting way. He will do everything to show us life is tragic and conflicted as a fact of 
nature. This inner conflict of life is why we laugh: we tend to laugh when we feel life's 
deep contradictions; laughing is a form of grieving over our conflicts (Kierkegaard 1843, p. 
29). We should even love our grief, since it, at least, cannot be taken from us: That which 
we grieve about, is deeply our own (Kierkegaard 1843, p. 30, 43). Grief is something which 
cannot be “fixed”, since it is heavily dependent on our individuality. It enhances our feeling 
of individuality and is therefore a healthy thing, a desirable feeling. Through this first 
exploration of Kierkegaard's aesthetic side, we notice his early existentialism: his 
understanding of life is much more a mood than it is a rational exploration of life. 
 But what is this conflicting mood about? What do we grieve for, exactly? Primarily, 
we grieve because we often cannot understand the relationship between causes and 
consequences. Reasons are conflicting, because we cannot find the difference between 
what the cause is and what the consequence of a certain action or occurrence 
(Kierkegaard 1843, p. 33). One can doubt which comes first, the perceived reason or the 
perceived consequence. A  is suspicious of reasons for another reason. If you have a reason 
to do something, you have nothing to win: You already “have” and thus own the reason, so 
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why would you do anything? That is why A  considers it better to do something without 
clear reason, to leave something left to win, which of course can never happen, since if it 
would happen, there would be nothing to win again: A’s life seems a constant failing which 
he constantly grieves (Kierkegaard 1843, p. 42). Our grief concerning this failing is an 
essential experience of life and should not be turned away from. 
 Contrary to grieving stands reflection as an effort of the mind to achieve clarity 
about what is cause and effect. Reflection is an unnatural activity according to A, since it 
takes the mind as principle instead of nature as it appears. When we reflect, we refrain 
from commanding nature with the very power of our will. Reflection turns our courage to 
doubt (Did I do the right thing?) and disables us to fight for anything new. The ultimate 
aim of reflection is to be deceived by the delight of the world and thus to deny other 
possibilities of being: reflection is meant to reinforce our own opinion about the world, 
without there being any objectivity to it. For the sake of possibilities, we should have the 
courage to doubt and fight, but not the courage to reflectively know and own 
(Kierkegaard 1843, p. 30, 32, 50). Knowledge, coming from reflection, tries to own and 
control. Through its controlling, it tries to convince us that desires are not as important as 
knowledge itself. Knowledge is thus the enemy of desire and of individuality, since 
knowledge tries to own that which it knows about. The essence of the individual however, 
is that it cannot be owned. To become individuals we should be a riddle to ourselves so we 
will not get bored with ourselves. Boredom is excruciating and all consuming: It enslaves 
us by revealing to us how absurd our quest for knowledge actually is (Kierkegaard 1843, p. 
33, 35 , 38, 46). Mediation is therefore a mistake, since true eternity lies before either/or 
and not beyond in a mediation between the either and the or. Mediation forces you to 
choose in a certain way, while an acceptance of the either/or can only happen through 
grief. Even boredom is a result of mediation, of an irreversible choice. A  knows that if he 
makes a choice, he will eventually repent the choice he made, whichever he makes. He 
therefore hides from any kind of repentance and choosing, since both actions limit him in 
his sense of freedom. He tells us he never starts with anything and even when he stops 
doing something, he does not quite stop, since he already stopped the moment he begun. 
It is impossibly hard for him to begin anew, because this implies a breach in his desire and 
therefore in his being. Here again he chooses for obscurity and paradox (Kierkegaard 1843, 
p. 48). 
 So we see that true eternity lies before the choice of Either/Or and not in it; hence 
A's inability to choose. He cannot choose since choosing would mean breaking with his old 
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self and committing himself to something new. Later we will see that this is the main 
difference between A  and B. B would agree with A  in the sense that true eternity lies 
before the Either/Or. However, for A  this is not a given of reality “to be suffered”, but 
rather the Either/Or  has to be chosen. Only in choosing the Either/Or in all its implications 
can we choose ourselves and become a center, instead of hiding in the shadows of the 
periphery. This, however, is B’s perspective, which I will analyze in the next chapter. 
 A’s perspective on the individual is hence not an individual who values a center. The 
“individual” is rather a setting out, always a displacing for the sake of staying unknown. He 
displaces himself by denying himself history: memory is something painful, because 
remembering means something passed, something died. Therefore memory is always 
falsely romanticized and love is nothing more than this false romanticizing of the past. In 
time and life, memory does not have any real function (Kierkegaard 1843, p. 41). Though, 
at another point he tells us we should live backwards. We should live in our memories 
since it is impossible to know the future. We should, again, choose to grieve our false 
romances by experiencing the chasm between our romantizations of our past and the cold 
truth of our present. This is what it means to live in the Either/Or: a constant grief for the 
contradictory nature of life (Kierkegaard 1843, p. 33). 
 Luckily we have another balm for our grievous soul. A  would be a nihilist if only he 
did not value his intellectual brilliance like he does. A’s power lies in the autonomy of his 
intellect, in his grasp of the conflict of the enframing of Either/Or. His intellect is a machine, 
though, which cannot rest. Therefore he has no patience to live: he is always saturated 
because of the quickness of his intellectual grasp, yet he is always hungry for more 
(Kierkegaard 1843, p. 33). At the same time, he tries to escape the machine in his head: 
being in a hurry – mentally as well as physically – is ridiculous, as if there were any progress. 
A  attempts to live life in the most profound sense, but because his attempts to live are so 
profound, he never quite achieves living life. This immediate knowledge makes his actions 
obscure. Sleeping is an activity of geniuses, he claims: there he is safe from himself, his self 
is obscured. In sleep, images of life come to him through dreams. He enjoys these 
representations and images, in theater as well as life. In this sense he is, what I would call, 
one of the old aesthetics: Those who dwell on art as a representation of nature. The 
modern artists, as we will see in the concluding chapter of chapter four, do no such thing. 
Yet, A  seems to diagnose the lack of his aesthetics: images of eternal beauty lie in a 
pathological disinterest in whatever is concrete. This is also his diagnose of metaphysics: 
the entire metaphysical system of imaging forth a more profound reality happens because 
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reality itself does not satisfy us. It has been philosophy's task to sell us these profound 
ideas. Over the years, philosophers have been nothing more than the sale people of 
metaphysics, paraphrasing Kierkegaard. I would argue that therefore the main function of 
philosophy is capitalistic in nature; to entice us with beautiful and interesting stories about 
the true nature of reality. So, again, it is better to sleep (Kierkegaard 1843, p. 37, 41). 
 Summarizing, we noticed how both A and B locate the eternal true choice before 
the Either/Or. This means that the forward slash signifies the representation of life as Ei-
ther/Or, but that it is only possible to find anything true if we accept the eternal conflict of 
this Either/Or itself. For A however, this does not come easy. He holds on to his creative 
individuality; he necessarily grieves this inner conflict of life: the conflict of choice. 
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2.2 Representation and Imagery: the Importance of the Opera 
 
So, as we saw, A feels that human beings are only able to relate to the 
enframing of the Either/Or choice in a tragic sense. Yet, he is also looking for a way to 
cope with this tragedy. His way of coping with it is by means of representation and 
imagery. The opera especially, as a complex representation of life, is an eternal bliss to 
human kind according to A, because the opera combines music with language. Music 
resembles the Either/Or: both have their own totality. Music cannot be analyzed in 
parts without destroying the music, while the Either/Or cannot be understood by 
analyzing its specific choices. Music represents the totality of the Either/Or.  Language, 
as an addition to music, clarifies this totality for the viewers of the opera. Through the 
opera, we will be able to experience (internally) and clarify (externally) the Either/Or.
 In our sleep and dreams, we encounter the obscurity of life. Life can never be truly 
known in a scientific way, since science will never be able to enlighten life's innermost 
obscurity. Rather, the ultimate result of life is a mood, a hue (Kierkegaard 1843, p. 37). 
Through this hue, the obscure becomes perceivable, without actually becoming any less 
obscure. The revelation of mood as primary instead of (for instance) reason, is one of 
Kierkegaard's early existential findings, which Heidegger will found much more 
elaborately when he talks about enframing (Gestell), which I will analyze in the third part 
of this thesis. The obscurity of the primary mood seems to be something A  suffers from: it 
heavies his soul. His aestheticism is heavily determined by a religious metaphysics: life is a 
constant unsolvable conflict and that is why A  has to suffer. This might be one of the 
reasons why A  enjoys representation and imagery in theater so much: It immunizes him, 
however temporarily, against the fear for the obscure in his own soul by providing an 
image of life where life is better than the real life (Kierkegaard 1843, p. 40). Later we will 
see that, according to Nietzsche, the essence of metaphysics lies in the following: 
metaphysicians turn away from life in resentment and create a powerful transcending 
image which makes life durable for weaker people. The durability of the metaphysical 
image is because of the inability to live with life as it is, according to me. A’s metaphysical 
aesthetics lie in this movement as well. He enjoys creating, which is defined as forcing 
occurrences to his hand and mind. He revels when his goal is achieved, since that means he 
is right in his metaphysics. This kind of thinking I would like to call enframing: goal oriented 
thinking in terms of praxis, a practical value which is always located outside of the discourse 
where thinking occurs. For instance, A  thinks about transcendent goals in real life (like art, 
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music and love), while most of his thinking is actually characterized by his own grief. He 
analyzes his grief as a mood, yet expects his mood to have a forcing implication in the 
outside world (in love, art and music). The enframing aspect of this thinking, in other 
words, lies in the fact that he mistakes an existential mood for a determination of reality. It 
is reality which is conflicting and obscure and A  feels a victim, while he is actually as much 
part of the “problem” as reality is. Basically, this immanent relation of a subject with its 
reality, is what Heidegger will later call Being (Dasein), a concept which I will analyze in part 
three of this writing. The source of Kierkegaard's aesthetics however, seems to lie in the 
fact that he does not see his relation to the world as mediating, but as creating or forcing 
(Kierkegaard 1843, p. 45). 
  So where is A’s immunization against the tragic life located, exactly? This 
immunization lies in the concept of immortality. Mozart achieved true immortality, 
according to A, because of his creation of Don Juan. The essence of this immortality, is 
that Don Juan's beauty does not lie outside of time as immortal, but rather inside time 
(Kierkegaard 1843, p. 58, 61). Immortality as a victory over time cannot exist, since then it 
would only exist in the either or the or. In other words, if Don Juan would transcend time, 
it would be too good to be true, it would be a choice for one side of existence, while 
excluding another. Rather, immortality lies before the demanding question of the either/or, 
which is why immortality can only be achieved by an abstract piece of music. In abstraction, 
music is embedded in its time, because an abstract work of art can never be reproduced at 
a later point in time (and is hence immortal), while concrete things can be copied. So, 
immortality is measured by the likelihood (the unlikeliness) of the replication of art. The 
idea of beauty will be expressed most perfectly in a work of art that cannot be reproduced. 
It is original and no one who is not Mozart will be able to copy it. In abstraction, a certain 
clarity can be achieved, a clarity which will withstand the test of time. A work which is very 
concrete will not survive for very long, because of the conflicting nature of life. The clarity 
of the abstract lies in the unity of content and idea. In a concrete work, the content and 
the idea will be ruthlessly divided, which leads to confusion and obscurity. Life already 
offers enough confusion and obscurity and art needs to reveal that fact by uniting content 
and idea, paraphrasing Kierkegaard. 
 It seems that the most abstract work of art is located furthest away from language, 
since language is bound to words, while music can be free from language. The importance 
of music seems to be a tendency in certain philosophy (see Schopenhauer, Nietzsche and 
Kierkegaard, among others). Music is the most essential expression of art for these 
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philosophers, because of its perfect unity between the idea and its expressing form; there 
is no difference between the two in music. In other words, music has its own particular 
flow of time, contrary to the more concrete arts, which can only be known through “the 
time of the clock”. These concrete arts are therefore closely related to the time they're 
constructed in. For this reason writers (for instance) can be brilliant in an epic sense, yet 
they are never able to create something immortal, since they express, through language, 
an historical idea. Music, however, cannot be analyzed in parts of history, without 
destroying the complete idea it attempts to express. Music is abstract, unlikely to be 
reproduced, immediate and therefore the immortal expression of the idea of a sensible 
genius. Because of this, music immunizes us against the destructive chaos of life like no 
other form of art. Time claims its place as the absolute in music, through which we relate 
to being. This concept (without the importance of music though) influenced Heidegger, 
who describes Being in terms of time, hence the title of his magnus opus, Being and Time. 
 The question soon becomes how language and the mind relate to music as art. A  
argues that the essence of human beings in our time is mind and the essence of language 
is thought. However, A  writes about music, he does not make music. So, A  admits he is an 
outsider when he analyzes music (Kierkegaard 1843, p. 72). Nevertheless, because of some 
sort of mood or image he has about music, he hopes he is still able to express something 
fundamental about it in language. According to A, language is the essence of the idea 
which shows itself in thought. What A  's interpretation of language actually implies, is that 
language is not something instrumental, but rather an expression of an idea (Kierkegaard 
1843, p. 73). A  practical example of this is the act of reading. When you read a book, you 
do not read separate letters. If you see every particular letter when you are reading, you 
can be sure you will not be able to get to the meaning of a text. Likewise, what should be 
heard escapes the sensible constantly. We hear through our ears, but not with our ears. 
Ears cannot hear as such, since they are not able to give meaning to what is heard. 
Meaning gets constructed within thought and therefore music is a language as well. 
 Continuing, A  argues that language is limited by music on all sides. Music is that 
which expresses itself in an immediate sense (Kierkegaard 1843, p. 76). Language cannot 
do this, since it is determined in reflection and always mediates. Music cannot be defined 
by language because of this immediateness. Surprisingly, A  sees this inability of music to 
mediate as a lack of music. Music lacks because it necessarily leaves something essential 
unsaid, it keeps essences hidden and vague. This is also why an opera like Don Juan is more 
worthwhile than a “mere” piece of music; the opera gives the room for meaningful 
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discourse about a piece of music, while joining it with the immediate immortality: the 
opera (and Don Juan specifically) is the ultimate form in sensible sense and mind and 
therefore the ultimate representation of how life is enframed. 
  So, we have seen that the inner conflict of life (the urgent call to choose be-
tween the either and the or) is something against which we need to immunize ourselves 
from time to time. This immunization occurs as metaphysics, as an image or representa-
tion of life, through which life becomes bearable. The best representation to achieve this 
immunization is through music, since music has its own flow of time; one cannot capture 
music in minutes, nor analyze a piece of music by cutting it into parts. In this way, music 
provides an obscure experience about the inner conflict of life, while temporarily remov-
ing us from the conflict of life. This temporary standing aside as observers, is what makes 
Mozart's Don Juan brilliant. Yet, however much A claims it chooses for the entirety of the 
Either/Or, the metaphysical aspect of this movement remains problematic, because, 
through this metaphysics, life is judged to be innately conflicted by someone who claims 
to have that power. However much this might actually be true, we cannot escape the no-
tion that it is not only life which is innately conflicted. When we silence our understanding 
of life in order to find relief in metaphysical music, we act out of resentment against life, 
as Nietzsche would show us. Kierkegaard's music becomes an escapist notion because of 
the unifying (and therefore metaphysical) tendency of the idea of music. We will analyze 
music further in part two of this thesis, after we have analyzed Nietzsche's take on it. 
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2.3 False Desire 
 
Previously I explored how the opera (as a representation of the enframing Ei-
ther/Or) is the eternal form of art according to A, because it lets us experience the 
tragedy of life as an image, while using language to clarify that same tragedy. Contr a-
ry to the opera though, is base desire. Desire forces us to choose the either or the or 
without actually knowing what it is that we desire. We simply feel that one choice is 
more desirable than the other, without actually knowing why. This is exactly what A 
feels that the Either/Or is about – and – what I would call succumbing to enframing; 
the enframing effect of the Either/Or is a demand for the illusionary choice, and the 
reasons for choosing are simply the groundless reasons of our dreams and far -fetched 
hopes.  
 In his description about the first of the immediate erotic stages, A  shows us a 
difference between owning something and desiring something (Kierkegaard 1843, p. 81). 
He asks himself what the difference is between owning something (which you already 
have) and desiring something (which you do not yet have). He claims that the object of our 
desire is already owned by us in representation. So, the object of our desire is never 
located outside of us: we always already have what we want. The representation of the 
object of our desire is already owned by us, since there cannot be a relationship between 
us and that object in any other way than through representation. In other words, we have 
a conception of what we want: we know exactly what we want. In this sense, knowing is 
owning. When we incorporate this idea of desiring as owning, how can we ever want 
something again without realizing we already have it? This idea is thus a very grievous 
insight, which leads to a sort of quiescence when A  talks about the erotic. It is a 
paradoxical view on desire which twists the standardized experience of desire, namely as 
some lack which needs to be filled. Everything which we desire, we already have, we 
already own. Desire effectively comes to a halt by this movement, it becomes light en 
silent, it escapes the desired object. In short, I would argue that desire becomes 
contemplative of an object which strictly speaking is not an object but an semi-object, 
simply because there is no such thing as the object we desire, but only our mental 
representation of it. The distance between desire and its object increases, it becomes a 
relationship between desire and its “sigh”: the sigh of our realization that we already own 
it. In A’s writing there is already a knowing and having, about the paradoxical insight that 
the object of desire is not at all the object of desire. 
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 In summary, the idea of desire has an illusionary character (Kierkegaard 1843, p. 84). 
One expects to change when one gets what one wants, to gain something more and new. 
This is however never true, since one already owns what one wants. In A's perspective, de-
siring anything would be an illusion, a dream.  
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2.4 True Desire 
 
 So far, we explored desire as dreaming, which is the illusion that we do not yet 
have what we want and that it would be so much better to own what we desire. Desire 
as dreaming is false desire, because of the illusionary character of the choice for the 
either or the or; the tragic demand for a choice cannot be breached by choosing. How-
ever, contrary to desire as dreaming, true desire is aesthetic desire. Aesthetic desire is 
the desire which occurs when we visit the opera and actually reside in the experience 
of the conflict of the Either/Or, without choosing for one or the other. The aesthetic 
desire is fueled by our awe at the obscure musical and clear conceptual revelation of 
the Either/Or. 
 One might expect this to end the discussion of desire. Yet, desire can take another 
form, which is very much unlike the one we just analyzed. According to A, there is 
something like “desire in its final phase”. This final phase of desire, according to A, is 
desire's definition as principle, which unites desire and its object in the sensible genius 
(Kierkegaard 1843, p. 90). Desire as dreaming fundamentally silences any form of desire 
one might have (as we saw in the previous chapter), yet with the coming to pass of desire 
in its final stage, conviction appears. We noticed before that the musical genius is 
ultimately found in Mozart's Don Juan, which leaves behind all passion, speculation and 
reasoning about the true character of aesthetic value. The true character of the aesthetic 
value has been found in Don Juan, because it inspires awe like nothing else. This awe leads 
to an eternal conviction of the true character of the Either/Or and, hence, to true desire 
for its representation in the opera. 
 To put the question concerning desire in historical perspective, A  analyzes the 
Greek era and the middle ages (Kierkegaard 1843, p. 93). The middle ages are the period 
of representation, according to A, because of dominating ideas of the scholar, the priest 
and the layman. These separate ideas are dominating for the essence of the middle ages. 
Their essence lies in the fact that they are indifferent toward and excluded from each 
other: the priest does not want anything to do with the lay man (in terms of contact or 
relation), the scholar wants nothing from the priest. This order of representation is a 
horizontal representation, rather than a vertical one. A  argues that these three concepts 
are in existence simultaneously, without actually interfering with each other. Here we see 
the essence of the religious conviction of A: he believes these categories are given. 
Nietzsche however, as we will see in part two, claims there is no such thing as horizontality, 
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even in the middle ages: It is the priest's sole purpose to keep the lay men in check. Yet, 
according to A, the individual idea of the priest stands next to the individual idea of the 
scholar, who stands next to the individual idea of the lay man. Even the king belongs to 
this horizontal realm of individual representation. The idea of representation cannot be 
found in the ancient Greek era, since the Greeks have only individuality and no 
representation, according to A  This is shown by the fact that Eros was never in love, 
although he was the god of love. There exists no love in Eros, since in the Greek era, only 
individuals are in love. They do not have a representation of the erotic female and thus no 
conception of monogamy. Eros is the god who makes love possible, who enables 
individuals to be in love. Yet, he is never in love himself, unlike the Christian God, who 
loves us all equal. 
 But, what does this division of love mean? In the Western world, Christianity and the 
Middle Ages provide the idea of representation, which was absent in the Greek era. This 
representation makes it possible for us to love an idea, rather than only an individual. 
Paradoxically, the birth of representation as such occurs by the exclusion of desire by the 
mind in the middle ages. Desire becomes something one should be reflective and mindful 
(literally) about with the Christians, according to A.  This means that desire is excluded as 
primary experience of love from the sensible and thrown into the realm of the mind: one 
should first love the idea, God. When listening to Don Juan for instance, the mind should 
not be “autonomous”, as that signifies reflection and reflection is Don Juan's demise 
(Kierkegaard 1843, p. 95). Reflection, as aesthetic indifference, already excludes the 
sensible: reflection does not care about art. It stops the music. It is reflection that aims to 
take power away from the sensible experience by rationalizing, categorizing and excluding 
the experience of the qualitative highest work of art – namely the opera – as “just another” 
work of art. Reflection necessarily chooses inside the Either/Or, either a divine or an 
earthly thing, in a metaphysics of aesthetics. A’s interpretation of Either/Or makes the 
reflective choice between the two either monstrous or unforgiving: choosing the wrong 
one means a consenting of power to rational reflection – means exclusion from true art, 
forever. A’s choice for Don Juan is thus very significant: for him the positing of the sensible 
as principle in the Christian middle ages is necessarily the epitome of the aesthetic 
experience in the unity of desire and its object. 
 So, we saw that desire can effectuate itself as desire as the metaphor of dreaming, 
which is no true desire after all. True desire, in A's opinion, is aesthetic desire. This aesthet-
ic desire takes the sensible as principle, which means that the sensible becomes an idea, a 
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concept of thought, as well as a concept which overflows thought, because of its genius 
musical composition. It is this principle which we find in the opera and which urges us to 
awe; we are immediately in awe when we experience the unity of music and language in 
the opera. Our awe at this unity makes the opera immortal; Don Juan as epitome of the 
opera astounds anyone with a sense of aesthetics. Seen existentially, we recognize an im-
portant aspect we will also find in Heidegger, we recognize our own (however limited) un-
derstanding of this surpassing experience through language. In other words, existence is 
defined as something we experience on the one hand – the movement from the musical 
toward us, and on the other hand our understanding of that experience – the movement 
from us toward something surpassing our experience of this music in the world. 
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2.5 Tragedy and Repentance 
 
 Previously we explored the difference between going along with the demand of 
the Either/Or, which A would call succumbing to false desire. And, we saw how true 
desire is a desire for the revelation of the Either/Or in its enframing effects, in its 
working. This enframing is tragic though, according to A, because we realize that we 
cannot escape its demand in day to day life. A's possible answer to this tragedy is re-
pentance: the ability to repent for our sins of succumbing to false desire for the either 
or the or. But, according to A, repentance primarily requires reflection, and reflection, 
in turn, is the death of tragedy. Reflection attempts to sweet-talk the tragic and to use 
it to our advantage. Thus, eventually, reflection and repentance are both examples of 
false desire for A: the desire to choose the either or the or. 
 The tragic should not be understood in an ethical way, according to A, since ethics 
emphasizes the notion of guilt in a tremendously unforgiving way (Kierkegaard 1843, p. 
143). Ethics makes the individual responsible and guilty for its actions, to an extent that it 
could kill the individual's autonomy with its powerful blaming gaze. The destruction of the 
individual by guilt is hence nothing tragic or evil; it is rather simply a bad thing: a 
misunderstanding. The softness of an aesthetic view on tragedy shows how an individual’s 
acts hovers in-between acting and suffering, between agency and an occurring, between 
either and or. When an act is reflected upon and reflected upon in an ethical way, the 
individual choice and solution of the either/or becomes more prominent. Yet, actually, this 
choice should never lie between the either and the or. The choice should be before the 
either/or, in favor of the tragic of the either/or, instead of the choice between either the 
guilty or the not guilty. This choice in favor of tragic signifies sadness, in aesthetic terms. 
Sadness is preferable to ethic guilt, because it opens up an experience of being: it opens 
up a mood instead of a judgment in terms of either/or. 
 When reflection in a tragic case is very prevalent, there will be an absence of 
aesthetic ambiguity in its meaning, according to A.  One cannot reflect and keep the 
aesthetic tragedy alive (at least not without music). For Kierkegaard, a new way of dealing 
with tragedy is the reflective way of repentance, which is, unsurprisingly, an attempt of 
synthesis of the either/or. Repentance shows its face when we actively think about 
suffering and consider how the tragic should be averted or prevented in the future. It 
searches for solutions where it should not search for solutions, for instance in church, in 
novels or in ethical philosophies (K1 161/148). Repentance is part of the dictionary of the 
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manager: “Why is this happening? Is there no other way?” (Kierkegaard 1843, p. 150). A 
more aesthetic approach would not yet decide that the occurrences should be improved. 
It would rather hover in-between guilt and innocence as a fundamental experience of our 
being. It is the objective of art to show this fundamental – yet fragmented – experience. 
For A, art is required to leave something behind, a legacy. This legacy, requires something 
more than this fundamental experience of being though. It requires a form of reflection 
we have not mentioned before (Kierkegaard 1843, p. 153). So apparently there are two 
different kinds of reflection, or rather, two different directions our reflection can take. 
 Reflection in the ethical sense consists of our ability to move out and search for 
something further away from ourselves. It leads to us forgetting ourselves in favor of 
principles of understanding. It represses our anxiety in order to immunize ourselves 
against that which can immediately affect us. Another kind of reflection – the aesthetic 
one – would be a reflection to the inside, to face our anxiety instead of hiding from it. We 
call this reflection an aesthetic one, because it is not fast, it does not provide direct 
solutions, but is rather a reflection of becoming (Kierkegaard 1843, p. 155). Anxiety is 
hence not a psychological condition, but it is the ground tone of being, according to A.  
Anxiety searches for sadness and desires it, because of its power to stand before the 
either/or, without attempting to hide from it. I said before that the demise of the 
individual cannot be something sad or evil, it is merely something bad in the sense that it is 
destructive. Facing anxiety, the individual never risks demise. What is destroyed is rather a 
small world, a small stage, an either/or. But the stage is not the outside, it is a showing of 
the inside before the mind. This is what aesthetic reflection is and why it is so immensely 
more valuable than an ethical repenting. 
 In summary, it appears that aesthetics win over ethics, at least in A's perspective. 
Aesthetics seriously deal with the inherent tragedy of our lives, not by escaping it, but by 
facing it and allowing ourselves to be influenced by the tragic. Reflection, on the other 
hand, is something ethical, since it is aimed at how things should be. In this sense, ethics 
are life denying and resenting of our existence. The opera, especially, allows us to experi-
ence the tragic and deal with it. However, one might argue that there is still some ethical 
realm inside A's concept of the aesthetic, because the suspicion arises that the opera is an 
image of how life should be, namely the tragic division between the principle of the sensi-
ble and the idea of the mind (thus, our understanding of the sensible). A's undoubted vic-
tory lies in his exploration of existence as a mood, a hue. Yet, he also defines this mood as 
inherently tragic. One cannot escape the impression that Kierkegaard, while writing using 
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A's name, was already under the impression that aesthetics would eventually fail in dealing 
with reality. 
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3. Mundane Ethics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 In the previous chapter, I explored how the aesthetic Kierkegaard, writing as A, 
interprets life as a continual choosing between this or that. This continual and unending 
choosing is something which we cannot escape and is therefore tragic. The tragedy resides 
in the fact that choosing is never enough; another choice is always implied in the first one. 
Only a true desire to see the enframing – the effectuating – of the Either/Or itself, by 
means of the opera, might give us any eternal understanding of life. In this chapter, I will 
interpret B's – ethical – answer to the aesthetic approach of the first chapter. The ethical B 
is disgusted by A's aesthetic focus on the tragic nature of life. Although B accepts the 
Either/Or and its demand on us, he reveals the demanding choice as that which makes life 
worthwhile instead of tragic. Eventually, B shows us that life is about choosing for the 
enframing of the Either/Or, because this enframing is the only way we can escape the 
tragic mood which accompanies an aesthetic approach.  This choice happens by means of 
repentance, a concept A so despised.  
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3.1 “Heaven” and “earth”  
 
 As we saw, A viewed repentance as part of enframing, since it requires 
reflection. Reflection is an enframing act, since it reasons out which of the choices is 
the best. Therefore repentance is aimed at providing a solution – a choice – between 
the Either/Or, which originates in the false desire to remove the Either/Or. B's critique 
to this vision is that it is deliberately tragic; A's vision is not an “objective” 
investigation of life, but a metaphysical inclination toward the tragic as higher ideal, 
as if all this tragic hardship makes you a better person. The ethical choice B proposes is 
a choice for the self as part of the Either/Or. This choice chooses the fact that all 
choices will appear in the form of Either/Or, yet it is not silenced by the tragedy of it, 
but uses its enframing to choose a simple, yet meaningful, life on earth. 
 The division of the book in its two parts is remarkable. It forces us to ask a few 
questions, before we start to see exactly what the content of the reply is. One question is 
why Kierkegaard chose this division instead of simply explaining to us what these two 
essential parts contain. Why does he “become” a different author in both parts? And: What 
does this division have to do with the title of the book? Does he expect us to choose sides 
here? And last but not least: Why did he write the aesthetic part of A  before B? Why is B a 
reply to A  instead of vice versa? To answer these questions, we should find out what his 
answer to A’s aesthetics is. 
 B describes A’s conflicted philosophy as an interpretation of majorly important 
occurrences in A’s life, which essentially always boil down to a choice between truth, 
justice and holiness on the one hand and lusts, inclinations and dark passions on the other 
hand. His main critique on A  is unexpected: B is critical about the important and intense 
occurrences in A’s life and rather focuses on choices in lesser important moments of his 
life (Kierkegaard 1843, p. 155). Contrary to those forces, which tend to pull a person 
between boredom, anxiety, beauty and the erotic, B reveals A’s habitat as one of aesthetic 
loneliness because of a fear of everything that is near him. In other words, A  lives in 
distant and intense concepts because of his fear for a choice for his own, simpler life. 
Simplicity is something which is very scary for A. 
 B claims, as we saw, that these conflicted forces can actually never be separated.  It 
is his personality which is created by the powerful tension between these two “sides”. B 
warns A  and urges him to end his passionate and destructive fight, which tries to kill 
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everything meaningful, because it only hardens his soul (Kierkegaard 1843, p. 158). It is 
surprising to read how B attempts to prevent A  from “hardening” or immunization, while 
A  himself wrote about the dangers of this immunization in ethics. However, these types 
of immunization are definitely different. We saw before that A  does not want to become 
immune in the sense that he flees from whatever suffering is in his soul. Moments of 
anxiety and suffering are precious to him. B however finds these tendencies destructive. 
His concept, which I call “immunizing”, has to do with creating an aversion for small things, 
for things near and close in reach. A  seems to be not at all interested in this nearness. B’s 
rhetoric however, is not one of reasonable debate, also because he realizes it is not in his 
power to win through reason from an aesthetic who appears to be so well educated. 
Rather, he claims a different logos, which is surprisingly an aesthetic and sensible one: his 
head reels from all the intensities in A’s writings, he cannot endure it (Kierkegaard 1843, p. 
158). Yet, to think that B’s response would be aesthetic, would be a conclusion drawn too 
soon. 
 There is only one project in a person’s life, B says, namely to win one's self. A's 
thought experiments are basically nothing more than a twisting around in the grasp of 
what he perceives as life: the tragic. To win one's self, one has to make a fundamental 
choice, which is not a choice for an abstraction like the Platonic Ideas, nor for a principle 
like sensibility, but a much simpler and easier choice in many ways, namely the choice for 
one's personality in its inner infinity. This choice is in another way immensely more 
complex though, because it is – in fact – a choice, unlike the aesthetics. One cannot choose 
to experience something tragic or to be astounded: the aesthetic just happens and can 
therefore never be a choice. This is perhaps why A  is not really an aesthetic: the tragic in 
his philosophy is his metaphysical attitude. The ethical choice B proposes is a choice of 
personal transfiguration, with a certain degree of mental seriousness towards one's own 
life and its nearness. What then is the meaning of the either/or in this context? It appears 
not to be a choice between good and evil, but rather a locus of meaning. The importance 
of the either/or – and B’s endeavor – is to make the either/or meaningful for A  He who 
lives aesthetically, does not live, does not choose. He merely tries to juggle balls, to endure 
himself in his conflictedness and to hide the truth of his own essential indifference for 
himself. This is what B calls desperation (Kierkegaard 1843, p. 188). 
 It is surprising that B, in his understanding of A, seems to make sense of him in a 
non-analytical way. We saw before that A does not think highly of mediation. Neither does 
A seem to be heavily focused on the future, since he tells us that true eternity lies before 
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either/or and not beyond in a mediation between the either and the or. However, B claims 
that A is mediating anyway, when he describes how B is concerned with how art is given 
meaning by past developments during the Greek and Medieval-Christian eras. 
Furthermore, B blames philosophy in general for this dive into the past: it is a philosophy 
which ended world history itself by culminating in tragedy and seeing no possible future 
anymore (Kierkegaard 1843, p. 167). The end of philosophy, or at least metaphysics, seems 
to be a powerful force in Kierkegaard's thought. 
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3.2 Hysteria and Despair 
 
Thus making choices is not a problem for B, the way it is for A: the choice for 
one's self can be a light choice, since one cannot be anyone else. It is not the opera 
which gives meaning to life, but rather meaning lies in daily and normal activities, 
meaning lies in the choice for the Either/Or as an active agent in life. B diagnoses A's 
heavy tragic mood as hysteria of the mind, which sacrifices the individual to tragic 
forces of nature. In other words, A knows he exists in a discourse of enframing, he is 
pulled in two directions (Either/Or) all the time. Hence, his solution is despair. He 
despairs in resentment, because he does not have another choice, a third choice. B, 
however, despairs because he chooses the desperate outside world absolutely, while 
remaining at the stable center in contrast.  
 Metaphysical philosophy has always been searching for an infinite category, 
independent of time and culture. In this regard, philosophy blinds itself for the either/or. It 
focuses on history and the historical process and does not want to know about what is 
happening now or what will be. It lacks because of its foundation of grief within the nature 
of the world: the world is no good as it is and we should find ways to immunize ourselves 
against the tragedy of time. Ethics however, takes time into consideration, according to B, 
and one's becoming into his own time. B basically returns freedom to philosophy through 
his discourse of choice. Reality is choosing and in making a choice the I receives itself and 
therefore comes back into itself (Kierkegaard 1843, p. 173). When I spoke about choice as 
being easy, I meant that choice is in fact a very light something: it is not heavied by the 
storms of lust in B’s perspective. The storm of lusts, as we noticed in A’s thinking, appears 
to be something nihilistic: it is the effort to purely create something, since there is actually 
nothing of value to be found in local life. Only the true opera's give meaning to life. But 
what about one's daily activities and work? Can work be meaningful at all? According to B, 
this is definitely the case. 
 A’s heaviness is actually seen as hysteria of the mind by B (Kierkegaard 1843, p. 184). 
He sees this hysteria as the only true sin, since it prohibits the individual to will with inner 
strength: it sacrifices the individual to the tragic forces of nature. Later, we will investigate 
how this hysteria of the mind correlates with the concept of nihilism according to 
Nietzsche, which also seems to prevent people from willing with inner strength. According 
to B, the reason for this hysteria of the mind is the original sin of Christendom. Here we 
meet Kierkegaard’s religious conviction. The original sin is deeply ours, because no one can 
45 
become truly transparent for himself: we are never without metaphysical opinions (about 
God), which is why we sin, since our knowledge is limited. The primacy of the will over the 
knowing subject, is what makes our soul heavy and is why we suffer. 
 Now, there appear to be two distinct ways of dealing with the hysteria as a reaction 
to the original sin. It is no surprise that these two ways are the aesthetic and the ethic. The 
aesthetic way of dealing with hysteria is actually no way of dealing with it at all; A's 
aesthetic is an aesthetic of despair. Despair is the essential element of the aesthetic life, 
according to B; it is the tempting beauty of it, because of its essence in a mood instead of 
in choosing the enframing process of Either/Or. In other words, the personality of the 
aesthetic A is immediate; it is there, on the surface of his intelligence. That is at least 
where it appears, because in itself the aesthetic is always conflicted. It lacks the force of 
direction of the self which the ethical choice provides in contrast. The aesthetic is fed up 
with the finite and strives only for the infinite (Kierkegaard 1843, p. 195). However much 
this infinite is located in time, as A argues, it still strives for a fleeing abstraction, it flees 
from life here, at this moment. The ethic also experiences the fear for its finite being, but 
its answer to it is different. The ethical answer to the fact of finitude and to the original 
sin, is not an answer of desperation and deceit, but an answer of choice and religion. 
Despair, as mood of life, is something with which the ethic and the aesthetic have to deal. 
The difference in answering is quite simple: the ethical choice is a choice for the self, a 
choice which enables the self to inhabit itself again, even though the outside is turbulent. 
The aesthetic is led by the outside, the ethic by the inside. The aesthetic however does not 
make the clear choice for despair, while the ethic does. The ethic chooses despair, but, 
because of this active choice, despair is transformed. Despair can only be despair when 
there is a lack of choice, when it is something passively undergone. So, in the ethical 
choice, the self is at home. 
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3.3 A Revitalization of Religious Repentance 
 
 We explored how the ethical choice for the Either/Or, according to B, is the 
absolute choice for the self. This absolute choice is the choice not to flee into any 
abstract thinking of far-away ideas and ideals, but instead choose whatever is nearby, 
practically, it is the choice (the eternal “yes”) for the frame of the Either/Or. Yet, we 
might ask how we can choose such a stable and absolute choice, while we so often 
experience the failing of the outside world. B's ability to choose this failing world 
exists because he knows we will always be wrong – in the face of God, at least. This 
means that opinions and truths only go as far as the social realm. When we feel we 
know how the world works, metaphysically, we cannot be anything else than wrong. 
By means of repentance for this wrong doing, we will be able to have the strength to 
choose our life without resentment. 
 How is the self-secured by an ethical choice? The self is secured through the 
positing of a truth through choice. But this truth had to be posited already for it to be 
chosen, according to B If it was not posited already, it could not be chosen. In this sense, it 
is possible to choose the absolute (namely God) and still not to choose absolutely. This 
truth is the essential fact of the original sin, which is the projecting of all our opinions unto 
God. The original sin is a fact of life, yet the aesthetic cannot deal with this fact, it keeps 
bugging him: A  finds no way to deal with it in a rightful manner. B found the answer, 
according to himself, in repentance. Repentance, which A  sees as life denying because it 
invalidates art, is something B deems necessary for an authentic choice, because it is an act 
which “throws an individual back unto himself.” When I repent my fundamental choice for 
myself, I am destined to work with my closest environment, instead of living in the bubble 
called metaphysics. Repentance allows me to grasp myself and live in myself, to endure 
the original sin and to give direction to the imperfection of life. The ethics of choice in 
light of repentance is lacking, contrary to the abundance of the aesthetic, and necessarily 
so. 
 Choice demands from me the ability to live with “just” that which is closest to me. 
This, on the other hand, is also what provides the self with a concrete richness instead of 
the thought experiments the aesthetic is so fond of. Repentance is based on choice and is 
the essential and only true choice for the either/or, according to B This choice is namely 
not a choice for either good or evil. It is a choice for good/evil and hence a confession of 
the good as well as the evil inside one's self. Repentance is therefore the choice. It is part 
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of the insight that choice also signifies the evil inside me. This is what I mean when I speak 
of the relative differential of aesthetics – the differential between what could be and what 
could not be – and the absolute differential of ethics – the inside of the world which has 
being as its fundamental characteristic. It seems that the ethical choice requires a lot more 
courage than the apparent trivial choices of the aesthetic, because it requires a vision of 
what is good in the most daily activities (Kierkegaard 1843, p. 216, 217). Even more 
demanding, the ethical choice requires one to want to live in the general, the public and 
the universal instead of in the special, the differentiated and the particular. It requires the 
courage to live in the center and not in the aesthetic periphery, to acquire a total-mood, to 
acquire being, which is continuous and time dependent. 
 Repentance, as we saw, is necessary for our freedom, since it enables us to live in 
peace with the evil inside us. Now, what is this evil? For B, this evil is nothing less than the 
original sin: our “truths” about the absolute (God, metaphysics). Because of this, 
repentance is also a testimony for our love for God and symbolizes the death of Christ for 
our sins. It enables us to go on again and not dwell on our original sin, while at the same 
time not diminishing the importance of the original sin. Kierkegaard's (B’s) perspective on 
the Greeks is interesting in this regards, also considering the development of 
existentialism from Kierkegaard to Heidegger later on. According to B, the Greek way of 
life fell short since they had no conception of the individual as principle. The individual 
could only choose itself in abstractum (all individuals were alike in being individuals, so to 
say, in Greek citizenship), so its achieved perfection was just as abstract (Kierkegaard 1843, 
p. 230). This is why repentance is necessary: it brings the individual in a concrete 
relationship with himself. The ethical choice is a choice toward clarity, a choice for the 
Apollonian, as we will see in the next chapter. To answer his own call for clarity, 
Kierkegaard explains his idea of  repentance with the idea that we are always already 
wrong in the face of God. This means that when we wish to be right at all times, we enter 
in a finite relationship with the world, since our wish always to be right will always need 
more proof: it is never enough to be right this time. On the other hand, when we wish to 
be in the wrong at all times when facing God, we actually enter in an infinite constructive 
relationship with the divine. This relationship is infinite because the choice includes every 
occurrence: in the face of God we are always wrong. When we choose to repent and be 
wrong in the face of God, B says, A  will finally know peace as well. Next to that, this choice 
is constructive, because only the infinite wrongness in the face of God encompasses 
continuity: it does not risk destruction because of an occurrence, but builds on 
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occurrences which all proof a person’s relationship towards God (Kierkegaard 1843, p. 
327). 
 To summarize, B's main critique towards A is that A is never at peace. He is always 
searching for meaning and justification of his world view. He finds this justification 
eventually in aesthetics and the opera especially. A attempts to make himself a unique 
individual, encompassing both the principle of the sensible and the so precious idea of the 
mind in language. Yet, because of the attempt to incorporate two conflicting notions, A's 
life is a conflict by itself. For A, this conflict is the acceptance of the either/or. B accuses A 
of being too attached to his own intellectual power and frustrations with life. According to 
A, B does not interpret the original sin in the right way. Both A and B might agree on the 
fact that the original sin is the “mood of life”, yet while A finds the tragic conflict of the 
original sin everywhere in daily life and therefore flees daily life, B accepts the original sin 
as a constructive force through repentance. We should repent the one basic fact of life: 
we are always wrong in the face of God. Through this repentance, one's self can inhabit 
itself again and be at peace, not in the high metaphysics and philosophy – since it is in the 
wrong there – but in the low efforts to make a worthwhile daily and simple life. 
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3.4 Summary and Conclusions on Kierkegaard 
 
 So far, I analyzed A's and B's positions, both pseudonyms for Kierkegaard himself. I 
explained how A's aesthetic world view is primarily based on a tragic mood. The tragic 
permeates his entire thinking and this is why Kierkegaard is called the father of 
existentialism. His philosophy does not deal with a rational metaphysical system, unlike so 
many philosophies before him. Rather it is about his mood and feeling about the 
enframing of the Either/Or in modern times. This enframing demands from him and 
everyone else to constantly make rather irrelevant choices, which are only essential in 
appearance. These choices are not true choices, since they only lead to more choices; a 
true and irreversible decision is never reached. To battle this emphasis on fake choices, A 
turns to the opera for salvation. The opera combines an immense musical representation 
of the tragedy of life, with an explanation of this tragedy in language. The real lessons of 
life are learned in the opera. Yet, as it appears, this aesthetic thinking is metaphysical 
thinking. The world itself is cruel and tragic, so we need an image of life (the opera) to 
comfort us. Because of this, an escape from enframing does not seem possible. For what 
else could the essential tragedy of the world be, than a technical rendition of what is 
experienced? In other words, I would like to argue that A's tragedy is not at all aesthetic; A 
is not astounded by the tragedy of the world, which would be an aesthetic experience. 
Rather, he assumes the world is tragic from a metaphysical presupposed position.  B might 
agree to this conclusion when he diagnoses A's metaphysical tragedy as hysteria of the 
mind. B agrees that the Either/Or leads to despair. Yet this despair does not lead B to 
hysteria, but to repentance. Through repentance we are able to continue to live with our 
past and all the mistakes we made. So, repentance is necessary to make life light as a 
feather in order to be able to carry the burdens of life with relative ease.  
 An important meta-question to this analysis would be why Kierkegaard chose to 
write a book called Either/Or and split it into two parts. It appears as if he is giving us a 
choice: either an aesthetic perspective or an ethical one. Yet, throughout his writing, both 
A and B made it sufficiently clear it is not acceptable to “just” choose between either the 
aesthetic or the ethical. B's critique on A, according to me, signifies that Kierkegaard is 
eventually an ethical thinker. First and foremost, one needs to repent and choose for one's 
self and one's beliefs. Afterward, aesthetic can be an approach to life, as a representation 
in the form of, for instance, a book. 
 Now we will turn towards Nietzsche. Nietzsche's thinking is similar to Kierkegaard's, 
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in the sense that they both pose similar questions, namely questions concerning how the 
world is enframed by means of ethics and aesthetics. However, we will see that Nietzsche 
answers these questions in a very different way. Kierkegaard “remains” a religious figure, 
someone who explains the significance and gain of accepting a religious (Christian) world 
view. Nietzsche, in contrast, is extremely suspicious of this religious power. He believes 
religion (and, by the way, philosophy) is used to keep people “small”, to turn them into 
obedient and docile creatures. By means of Nietzsche, I will analyze more deeply how the 
world is enframed by hiding this other side of religion. 
 After discussing Nietzsche, I will shed light on Heidegger's “modern” existential 
philosophy. Both Kierkegaard and Nietzsche were very intimate with their own thinking, in 
the sense that they write personally and radically. Although Heidegger's philosophy is no 
less radical, he seems to have found some personal distance to the problem of the 
enframing of our world. This distance might be just what is necessary to put Kierkegaard's 
and Nietzsche's frames in proper perspective in our modern age. 
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4. The Final Metaphysics: Securing & Enhancing 
 
 A thinker who poses quite similar questions as Kierkegaard, but answers them 
radically differently, is Nietzsche. We already saw that Kierkegaard's final answer to the 
enframing power of the Either/Or is the ethical approach of repentance, which is sustained 
by the idea that one is always wrong concerning metaphysical matters. The idea that one 
is always wrong however, presupposes a God or other metaphysical authority that is 
always right. Eventually, this is something one can only believe in. It is exactly this believing 
attitude that Nietzsche would find very problematic. Nietzsche, as well as his idol, Wagner, 
both believed that religion is not sustainable anymore in easing the pain of existence in 
our modern era. Wagner, however, was much closer to Kierkegaard, because he thought 
music could take over the role of religion. Nietzsche differed radically from these two, 
because he felt that religion and its modes of experiencing were done for forever. It was 
the arts rather, that could provide a renewal of the Greek tragedy, by which people could 
feel connectedness with each other again. Therefore, Nietzsche created the opposing 
categories of the Apollonian and the Dionysian. The Dionysian, named especially after the 
Greek god of wine, ecstasy, chaos and pluralistic impulses is important, since these 
impulses have been suppressed in society since the beginning of Western philosophy by 
the tendencies of the Apollonian way of enframing. This Apollonian enframing teaches us 
that reason is important above all else. Nietzsche attempts to revive the Dionysian chaotic 
ways of feeling and to incorporate both the Apollonian enframing and the Dionysian anti-
enframing in daily life. Eventually, this integration evolves into the idea of the Will to 
Power. Both, the Apollonian enframing and the Dionysian chaos, work together to secure 
truths and to enhance life. They appear to be two concepts (Dionysian and Apollonian), yet 
they do not exist separately. Basically, both concepts are descriptions of how power 
works: what is held on to as “true” (the Apollonian) and what is developed as “new” (the 
Dionysian). Eventually, this happens by the Nietzschean concept of Eternal Recurrence: the 
enhancement of life is based upon and added to our scientific enframed truths, which is an 
eternal recurring process. Modernity, in this sense, is a time of constant accumulating of 
new things and storing them (enframing) in the storehouses of old.  
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4.1 Dionysus and Apollo 
 
 In the previous chapter, I analyzed how Kierkegaard primarily chooses the 
ethical (real) choice for the self, which relocates the aesthetic experience from the 
center (A's perspective) to the margin (B's concluding perspective). According to 
Nietzsche, such a powerful “choice” or translocation could already be found in Plato's 
thinking. Nietzsche tells us about Plato's philosophy by creating the concepts 
Apollonian and Dionysian, which relate to the Greek gods. Plato's thinking and 
Western philosophy in general, according to Nietzsche, is primarily Apollonian, 
meaning that there is not much room for the validity of ecstatic experiences in our 
society. Rather, the rational, moderate (Apollonian) experiences are seen as 
sustainable, while the ecstatic (Dionysian) experiences need to be repressed. 
 In the previous chapter we noticed that Kierkegaard emphasizes transparency and 
generalizability in the ethical choice of the self. It should be our goal to become a 
transparent and general self, in order to live well, he says. Further, it seems that, for 
Kierkegaard, becoming a general and transparent self means accepting religion's and 
society's frame, in order to connect to that discourse and eventually to become part of it. 
This also means that, to become general and transparent, we have to become embedded 
in an already powerful discourse. Only then can we speak of the general (the accepted 
standard) and the transparent (recognizability). So, Kierkegaard's view on the matter of 
ethical choice does not seem to be very suspicious of the uses of power in the ethical 
sphere. The enframing we can now  call the Apollonian, which is the structured effort to 
bring clarity into the world by means of technology. This process of enframing can be seen 
as the banishment of power into the aesthetic fake-choice. This banishment is the act of 
Apollo, who cannot stand the conflicting chaos of the Dionysian. So, Kierkegaard's concept 
of art is, in accordance with Western philosophy, an Apollonian concept of art, which he 
not nearly appreciates as much as the ethical choice. 
 By denouncing the aesthetic choice as a fake-choice, Kierkegaard intends to show 
us that the aesthetic choice is part of the enframing of the Either/Or. The aesthetic only 
gains temporary satisfaction by choosing between the either and the or: There is need to 
choose it over and over again in any new situation, yet A  always chooses in the same way, 
namely through his enframed Apollonian mind. The choice always returns and does not 
give real satisfaction like the ethical choice. Ethics would harbor the real choice, the only 
choice which is resolvable. This is the choice for the entirety of the immense either/or: The 
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choice to always accept the rift the either/or brings. The aesthetic becomes lost in the face 
of this choice. The aesthetic hesitantly chooses because he made choices like these before. 
Yet the ethic is able to live with the conflict of Either/Or, through his repentance to God. 
The ethic knows his choice is always wrong in the face of God, since only in God is the 
ethical choice truly resolved. So, only because we are always wrong in the face of god is it 
possible to repent and thus to truly choose for organized life. Contrary to Kierkegaard's 
concept of art, Nietzsche wanted to explore a concept which was lost since the coming to 
power of Plato's Apollonian thinking. Nietzsche does not accept Kierkegaard's ethical 
solution, because he believes Kierkegaard's Apollonian idea of art – and the analysis of the 
problem – was faulty from the beginning. Kierkegaard's ethical choice would mean that an 
individual needs to close his eyes for the powers which force him to accept this ethical 
choice. Repentance in the face of God disgusts Nietzsche, since it means that the 
individual purposefully blinds himself. However well we would be able to live by repenting, 
repentance signifies a denial of life. Nietzsche wanted to lead his readers straight into the 
night of the unorganized shadow side of ethics (Nietzsche 1870-1, aph. 516). 
 This night is the night of Dionysus, the god of wine and excess. Nietzsche describes 
this god as the authoritative figure of the Greek tragedies and attributes to him the 
qualities that make life possible. It is important to realize Nietzsche is primarily concerned 
with life (in a positive sense) and analyzes most other concepts like truth, religion and 
science in terms of life. In Nietzsche, we find similar questions compared to those asked by 
Kierkegaard, with an apparent opposite answer. To make life endurable, Nietzsche says, 
one has to be in an enveloping atmosphere  of ignorance, illusions and dreams (Nietzsche 
1983, p. 323), contrary to Kierkegaard's attempt to repent for our ignorance. It is an 
entirely different matter to accept ignorance as a part of life (Nietzsche's Dionysus) or to 
repent for it as a uncomfortable part of life (Kierkegaard's Apollo). Especially music – the 
Wagnerian kind – celebrating the affections through drama – is needed for life to become 
strong. Wagner's music totally envelops man in an atmosphere which celebrates life in all 
its chaotic and ecstatic qualities and does not turn away from it in repentance.  In this, 
Nietzsche is the anti-Socrates. Where Socrates is the one to pose that “everything must be 
conscious in order to be good” (Nietzsche 1870-2, p. 540), Nietzsche uses the pair of 
opposites – Dionysus and Apollo – to interpret the emergence of the Greek pre-Socratic 
tragedy, where there still was room for communal forms of society which revealed the 
injustice of the hidden intentions of the gods. The life-enhancing Dionysian spectacle was 
able to uncover the injustice of this destiny. Thanks to Dionysus, the arbitrariness of the 
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gods can be overcome. This tradition of tragedy, according to Nietzsche, is effectively 
killed by the coming to power of Socrates' Apollonian ideal of clarity, since the entire 
Western philosophy, with Socrates as its founder, is Apollonian in nature. Nietzsche's 
reason for resurrecting the Dionysian as the counterpart of the Apollonian clarity and 
healthy logic, is that he suspects a movement of terror in the suppression and destruction 
of passions. Dionysus is the god of wine and the passions. His resurrection enables us to 
reduce the walls we construct around our feelings. Embracing our feelings as valid, when 
the walls are down, is what makes life rich. On the contrary, Apollo is the god of reason, of 
health and sobriety and of the unity of the ego (Nietzsche 1872, § 23). Nietzsche distrusts 
Apollo as a force to give direction to life, since consciousness creates a distance to life 
which it can never bridge to experience. The value of consciousness, progress and the 
(enlightened) individual, has been overestimated since Plato. 
 This myth of Dionysus and Apollo was an artistic – and metaphysical – creation we 
need in order to be able to live with the chaotic and ecstatic nature of our lives. But life 
needs organization in order to be livable. Before, Kierkegaard's organization of life lies in 
ethics, as basic repentance. Nietzsche neither agrees with Kierkegaard's Apollonian 
interpretation of aesthetics, nor with his easy acceptance of God and he redefines 
aesthetics a Dionysian force, to give life back its vitality. Nietzsche therefore returns the 
rights to live to the shadows on the wall of the Plato's cave. In contrast, Kierkegaard 
strengthened the Apollonian ethics by adding a Christian foundation of original choice. 
When we embrace this ethical, original choice to repent, aesthetics becomes just an 
option – as hobby. According to Kierkegaard, we need to live ethically. 
 Wagner would heartily agree with the need for religious redemption to make life 
sustainable. He was of one mind with Nietzsche concerning the inability of religion to 
fulfill its function in modern times. Religion simply cannot offer the certainty to live life 
well, in these socially different times. This is why Wagner embraced art as the modern 
alternative for religion's failing. Wagner's revival of art as the religious essence is what 
drives Nietzsche and Wagner apart. Nietzsche was never a great lover of religion, so he 
interpreted art not as a redemption, but as the possibility of the enhancement of life. He 
saw religion, as well as Wagner's attempts to establish religious art, as fundamentally life-
denying. His reason for judging so is that, fundamentally, the most essential characteristic 
of life is that it enhances itself. Religion, as well as religious art, does not accept this 
enhancement of life. Instead, a religious foundation leads to life-denial, because it denies 
Dionysus. The myth of Dionysus can be seen as returning the dialogue with nature to life 
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in order to enhance life (Safranski 2002, p. 101). The Apollonian denies the dialogue with 
nature because of its methods of enframing. For this reason myths are much more 
valuable than certain rational philosophies, like the Kantian categorical imperative, which 
is only a thought experiment – as if life worked that way! Nietzsche's aim was to “remain 
faithful to the earth” (Nietzsche 1883, § 3). It is important to emphasize that Nietzsche did 
not see Apollo as an enemy who needs to be utterly destroyed. The enframing of life is 
something which we should not hide from. Yet, in society, the Apollonian is always seen as 
bigger and better. Clarity of writing and of ideas are always judged to be better than a 
movement to make things obscure, affectionate and chaotic. Somehow, through Socrates 
and other ascetic priests, Apollo became the worshiped God, while Dionysus was 
forgotten. This movement makes Nietzsche very suspicious of the enframing ideal of 
Apollo. In this suspicion of reason, an early existentialism shows up: Heidegger will 
eventually redefine thought against its misuse as mere thought-experiment. However, 
Nietzsche's “area of research” is a different one than Heidegger's ontological one at this 
point. Nietzsche is primarily concerned with myth and art as revolutionary in society, 
fighting against the “overwhelming indifference” towards life he perceives in German and 
European culture. People seem to live life and die, all the time, without there being 
anything which made them ecstatic. Nietzsche saw the mythical “as a life force that 
returns a festive bounty to being” (Nietzsche 1872, § 23). In this festive bounty we see art 
becoming a truly public affair, in contrast to the hyper-individual enframing affair we see 
in Kierkegaard's aesthetics. Kierkegaard's aesthetic is purely interested in his own case, in 
his own values and his own thinking. A  does not seem to care about other people or 
culture. Nietzsche however, as well as Wagner, are truly concerned with the sake of 
culture and society and not so much with the sake of individuals. 
 So far, we analyzed the history of philosophy and western thinking in terms of the 
Dionysian and Apollonian. We saw that Plato effectively destroyed the Dionysian. 
Kierkegaard also seems to accept the Apollonian as more important in both his aesthetics 
as well as his ethics. The primary ethical choice must be a choice for transparency and the 
ability to be generalized, which are both Apollonian ideals. The aesthetic Kierkegaard gains 
strength from his individuality and brilliant mind, also Apollonian ideals. Nietzsche 
perceives these Apollonian tendencies as life-denying and aims to revive the Dionysian 
chaotic life-giving in art, in order to make life worth living again. 
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4.2 The Dionysian Life Force – a contemporary example 
 
 I analyzed previously how the Apollonian ideal attempts to unify and enframe, 
through religion, science and rationality. The Dionysian, on the other hand, is the 
concealed concept of the plural, of disorganized and chaotic effects. We are able to 
recognize these concepts in the way we approach music and noise. We noticed earlier 
that the aesthetic Kierkegaard experienced the opera as a revelation of the conflicted 
and tragic nature of life. Yet, this conflicted and tragic notion, which we could call 
Dionysian, is still forced into the unity of the opera and not found in life “as it 
happens”. The aesthetic Kierkegaard picks up this musical attempt to show chaos by 
actually hiding it in the frame of the opera. Looking at music from a truly Dionysian 
point of view, it becomes nothing less than noise. Music becomes a sea of random and 
irregular sounds. And, sometimes, a few of those sounds happen to sound like 
something structured, as the contemporary philosopher Serrès shows. 
 Nietzsche found the perfect manifestation of the Dionysian life force in Wagner. 
The resounding foundation of Wagner's opera's is Dionysian. The opera is musical ecstasy 
“all-pervasive as white noise, atmosphere, and milieu [emphasis KP], and has become the 
acoustic backdrop of our entire existence.”(Safranski 2002, p. 101) Here we see clearly 
what Nietzsche intends with the Dionysian: it is the Big Bang of life, interpreted as primary 
ecstasy, as a celebration of the victory of nature and being. According to some 
philosophers, music has been regarded as the highest amongst the arts, for a very simple 
reason: music is direct, its medium is itself. It is not a random fact that the Big Bang is a 
metaphor of sound. Other forms of art use external media: sculpture and paintings for 
instance. Instead, music touches the soul directly. This is why we see this focus on music as 
the prime metaphysical entity in numerous philosophers, from Schopenhauer in the 19th 
century to the contemporary French thinker Michel Serrès, who tells us: “There is no gray, 
strictly speaking. There is white, the sum of colors, there is noisiness, the totality of 
number.” And again when he says: “Noise, again. The background noise is permanent, it is 
the ground of the world, the backdrop of the universe, the background of being, maybe” 
(Serrès 1995, p. 62). This is why the specific book I quoted is called Genesis. However, 
Serrès distinguishes his noise from the metaphysical music of the 19th century. He bids us 
not to think of music as a singular and metaphysical system. The idea of music as a singular 
system can be found in the principium individuationis (the principle of individuation), as 
understood by Schopenhauer. The principium individuationis is the epitome of Apollonian 
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metaphysics and signifies that everything in nature strives to individualize and separate 
itself. 
This way of thinking is the opposite of the Dionysian, where components do not 
strive to become individual at all, yet they stay chaotic and irregular. Nietzsche's critique 
on philosophy is hence not just a critique on Plato, who fought so valiantly for Apollo. 
Rather, it is a critique of the entire history of the West, since the core of Western thinking 
is unifying and driven by the principium individuationis. In fact, this means that every 
metaphysics – from ancient Greek metaphysics to Nietzsche – aims to individualize itself. 
This principle is something both Serrès and Nietzsche attempt to supplement with the 
Dionysian, since the Dionysian has been forgotten throughout history. Their critique is 
hence a critique of the West, yet it is also embedded in the West, since even the complex 
chaotic Dionysian music of Wagner is one piece with one name: it is unified in some sense 
into an individual piece. According to Serrès, what happens in Western philosophy is that 
the multiple (Dionysus) is subsumed under the one (Apollo). The subsumation of 
multiplicity under unity – thus the subsumation of diversity under one singular principle – 
“is scholarly magisterial and ecclesial arrogance” (Serrès 1995, p. 5). In other words: The 
subsumation which is so essential to Western thinking is caused by scholars and the clergy 
- of the elite. This is exactly why Serrès speaks about noise and not sound or music: “The 
most amazing thing in the world is that agreement, understanding, harmony, sometimes 
[emphasis KP] exist.” (Serrès 2007, p. 121). This existence of the Apollonian harmony is 
only a happenstance in nature. Yet, being part of the same Western thinking he is 
criticizing, Nietzsche cannot escape the need for one metaphysical foundation of that 
backdrop of the universe that is noise. The reason for this need and the entire need of the 
West, is that Dionysus does not do justice to life in the sense that he does not judge. The 
chaotic Dionysian just as easily kills as it gives birth, without any given reason other than 
life. Reason is Apollo's domain, so a pure Dionysian life (if it were at all possible) would kill 
individuality without remorse, in favor for life itself. Apollo was hence the god who 
became dominant in Western thinking. Yet, he became so dominant, that we forgot that 
justice is not everything: Sometimes we are at the disposal of fate. So, there are two ways 
– maybe more – of dealing with injustice and accidents. One of them is Apollo, the god 
who uses “divine” reason to show us why things are how they are. But, this showing is also 
a creating. “Reasoning things out” in the Nietzschean sense would not so much be about 
clarifying, but rather it would be about forcing a reason onto reality in order to hide a fear 
for the Dionysic chaos. Nietzsche's suspicion of reason lies in the fact that reasons are 
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never just meant to explain. More importantly, they are meant to exact over reality. 
 Nietzsche's hope lies in the mythical arts, because these arts signify the resurrection 
of Dionysus vis-a-vis the enframing Apollo. The latter gives solace to the tremendous 
injustice our world does to the multiplicity of the presupposition we call the individual 
(Safranski 2002, 103). In other words, the (Apollonian) individual as some sort of solid-
founded being can be seen, mythically, as a conquering of the chaotic multiplicity of 
Dionysus. This conquering is the creation of the individual and at the same time a limiting 
of the multiplicity. Nietzsche breaks with the powerful mainstream process of enframing, 
by re-creating two forgotten gods for the future. In contrast to this, the ethical world view 
of Kierkegaard might offer solace as well, because it teaches individuals to unconditionally 
choose the cards fate has already dealt them. The ethical choice allows us to convince 
ourselves that these cards are ours by God's will and not random and chaotic at all. 
Nietzsche was not able to see how a person with such a moralistic attitude could still be 
passionately in love with life. Rather, he believes that such an ethical person would be in 
love with God, an entity beyond life. Nietzsche found this choice utterly life-denying. 
“Even if all of mankind should need to perish – and who would doubt this! - man has been 
charged with a goal, as the loftiest task for all time to come, of growing together into 
oneness and commonality so that mankind can confront its impending doom as a united 
entity and with a sense of the tragic. This loftiest of all tasks encompasses the sum total of 
the ennoblement of mankind.” (Nietzsche 1876, § 4) 
 The above quote shows Nietzsche's inner conflict like no other. Man needs to perish, 
since man cannot ever stand the chaotic – Dionysian – diversity which is life. Eventually, life 
will kill man; this is as certain as it gets. Yet man still has a task to grow into oneness, to 
deal with the Dionysian tragedy without always repressing and running from it. Nietzsche 
saw this happening in the Greek pre-socratic tragedies, in which suffering was shared. 
Kierkegaard takes the goal man sets itself (toward oneness) as the one true choice of 
ethics. He does not “zoom out” as much as Nietzsche does, for his choice takes man right 
into his local life, which does not deal with external goals or the death of all mankind. 
Rather, the ethical choice is a choice for a local life; the choice for the difficulty of loving 
your wife and raising your kids. Kierkegaard's critique on philosophy is that it can never live 
without “zooming-out” and analyzing life from an external standpoint. Nietzsche's critique 
on philosophy is that it always unifies whatever diversity it finds. These critiques do not 
seem to immediately exclude each other. 
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 In this chapter, we explored how Nietzsche's creation of the concepts based on the 
gods Apollo and Dionysus, shed light on concepts like diversity and unity. By creating these 
concepts, Nietzsche revealed how reason and religion attempt to unify. More importantly, 
he revealed how attempts to unify can be very dangerous, because these attempts tend 
to disrupt or even destroy the chaotic diversity and fluidity which enhances life and makes 
life flourish. In other words, attempts to unify (through religion, reason, science and other 
examples of enframing) do not bring real change, but always aim to preserve the 
presuppositions we have. Yet, we need preservation as well, if we are to survive all the 
anxiety because of our own incongruence with the world. So, both gods, Apollo and 
Dionysus, can be seen as active principles in our lives. One should strive to accommodate 
both gods in one's life. 
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4.3 Bodily Experience & Conceptual Experience 
 
 So, we noticed that an Apollonian idea of sound is aimed at establishing music 
as a single piece, a totality of music, technologically enframed (into musical staff et 
cetera) to give an experience of life. On the other hand, a Dionysian interpretation 
would start at noise, out of which – accidentally – structure might occur now and then. 
Nietzsche's interpretation of life rests on this distinction. In the development of 
Nietzsche's thinking, the Dionysian category can be seen as bodily experience. This 
means that the Dionysian is the validation of the aesthetic experience of feeling and 
sensibility, in contrast to conceptual experience, or thoughtful enframing (the 
Apollonian), which was more valuable throughout history. 
 But, could Kierkegaard not be right, when he determines that art is an individual's 
hobby, which is merely valid after one chooses the true ethical choice? Art does not seem 
to discharge us from the necessity to be transparent in service of others – be it a family, 
society or political life. For instance, in our society, we see that art is often positioned in 
the margin of society, while the Apollonian rationality appears to be the mainstream, 
socially accepted position of life. The difference between Kierkegaard's ethical choice and 
Nietzsche's favor for Dionysus is not that simple, though. We explained before how the 
rift between pre-socratic and socratic philosophy destroyed the validity of the Dionysian 
idea, until Nietzsche revived it. Yet Kierkegaard does not make a distinction between the 
pre-socratic and the socratic. Kierkegaard refers to the entire Greek civilization as 
aesthetic, since the Greeks would lack the idea of the sensible in their thinking. The Greeks 
only knew the sensible in its sensibility; hence it could not be excluded, nor included: It 
simply was here. What this means is that the Greek society was purely sensible: the 
Dionysian lusts were satisfied, regardless of any possible shame or guilt concerning 
marriage and other institutions. Shame and guilt in sexuality came into existence because 
of the Christian world view, which ruthlessly pulled the aesthetic out of the bodily or 
sensible and put it into containers of thought, called concepts. And as concept, the 
richness of the bodily experience will never survive. Only as thought could sensibility be 
excluded and simultaneously posited by the Christian faith. So, sensibility is excluded in 
the sense that it became hidden, what means that people thought it should not be part of 
life, while it actually – obviously, since we are still here – was. Here, sensibility became 
something to shun (Kierkegaard 1843, p. 105). An example of this exclusion of the sensible 
by thought is the difference between the Greek gods and the Christian one. The Greek 
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god Eros for instance, was an icon for sensible love. Eros himself, however, was never in 
love (Kierkegaard 1843, p. 69). He made love possible, yet he himself did not love. The 
Christian God, on the other hand, does love Himself. So, love has been displaced from 
bodily experience into the realm of concepts. Kierkegaard's aesthetic does not actually 
distinguish between a pre- and post-Platonic era in Greek thought, although he does 
distinguish between the Greek era and the Christian era. So, how does Kierkegaard choose? 
Does he, like Nietzsche, envision the lack of the sensible in modern times? Or does he 
choose for Christianity's profit? In other words, does he choose thought as having a higher 
validity than the sensible? Kierkegaard's ethics lead him to take the Christian invention of 
clarity and organized life as more important. How can one truly choose in a sensible world? 
This is never possible, according to Kierkegaard. One can only choose in thinking and in 
repentance of the sensible, as we saw before when we analyzed the aesthetic and the 
ethic. Kierkegaard's easy acceptance of the ethical Apollonian clarity of ideas is probably 
why Heidegger calls Kierkegaard not a philosopher, but a religious writer – although an 
important one. Heidegger also warns us, that the comparison between Kierkegaard and 
Nietzsche has become customary, but therefore no less questionable (Heidegger 1977, p. 
94). This questionable aspect lies exactly in the reading of Kierkegaard as a (western) 
philosopher. The western tradition of philosophy has its earliest and perhaps most forcing 
representation in Plato. Even Nietzsche, who tends to experience the world as 180 
degrees opposite to Plato, needs Plato's destroyed foundation to create the new temple 
of mythical art. However, Kierkegaard does not seem to see Plato's philosophy as a turning 
point from the bodily to thought. 
 So far, we retold how Nietzsche saw mythical art as the enhancement of life, after 
the failure of religion. This enhancement is built upon the rediscovering of Dionysus, of 
the creative and destructive aspects of life, a rediscovery of the chaos of life which is nec-
essary for life itself to flourish. Contrary to this, the Apollonian wants to preserve certain 
structures, not the least of which is the individual. The Dionysian (as chaotic and life-
enhancing) hence faces religion's binding and preserving aspect. Preserving is not enough, 
because a system which is only focused on preserving what it has, will ultimately fail. En-
hancement is necessary for life, and the mythical arts, according to Nietzsche, are its pro-
vider. Kierkegaard, on the other hand, recognizes a saving power in a person's ability to 
choose for a certain life and therefore preserve the life which he chose. Kierkegaard is a 
traditional thinker and takes a clear stand against a primary aesthetic and self-enhancing 
approach. Nietzsche is the liberal thinker, who attempts to enhance life and fight against 
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the organizing and controlling aspects of life. 
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4.4 The Positivist and the Cosmos meet in the Will to Power 
 
 Nietzsche revives the chaotic in nature (Dionysus) with an unparalleled 
intensity. As we saw in the previous chapter, this revival occurs as aesthetics, as 
feeling. Nietzsche attempts to reintegrate the Dionysian into life, performatively, just 
like the Apollonian enframing that is already performed day to day. Both of these 
concepts, when put together, signify the working of power. The Apollonian is the 
designation of how life is understood and thus how life is enframed. The Dionysian 
(anti-enframing) points to the elements of change and chaos, which give life its 
freshness and surprise. Hence, the Apollonian is a positivist force: it sees nature as 
lifeless and usable. The Dionysian is the perspective of the immense cosmos, in which 
nothing is in our control. In other words, the securing force of the A pollonian and the 
enhancing force of the Dionysian meet in the Will to Power. 
 Hence, Nietzsche tries to find this new chaotic, multiplex, and life-giving Dionysian 
in an apparently singular Apollonian basis of human oneness, as the quote on page 49 of 
this thesis shows. Yet, he is rooted in the European philosophical tradition and he 
desperately tries to remove what he perceives as negative of that tradition, namely the 
dominance of the always-healthy Apollonian unilateral ego. “Stop feeling like such a 
fantastic ego! Learn to cast off bit by bit your alleged individuality” (Nietzsche 1926, § 443).  
This Apollonian unilateral ego however, is not the only thing Nietzsche finds problematic. 
Why would he even feel so strongly against his alleged individuality? So, he not only 
considers his alleged individuality a problem, but also his strong feelings against his 
individuality. This feeling seems like a Dionysian allergy towards the Apollonian ego. The 
ego might be Apollonian in nature, yet the perceiving of this ego as such an immense 
negative force can surely be called Dionysian. He has two antidotes, one for his 
individuality and the other for his extreme feeling. He calls these antidotes experiencing on 
a cosmic level and positivism. He wants to get rid of organic thinking, of being lived by 
nature and by a faulty culture. Dead and cold things are much better teachers than people, 
who call upon feelings. These projected feelings are basically an oversight of existence: 
They never served any purpose but to make people into herd animals. Nietzsche's 
immediate task is to purge emotions of self-denial from existence, to annihilate feelings 
from social life. Note that these feelings of self-denial are Dionysian in nature: Dionysian 
feelings are life-affirming, while more socially acceptable emotions are emotions of the 
herd animal.. Herd feelings are oppressive in nature, while Dionysian feelings are liberating. 
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So he wants to dehumanize nature (in order to “zoom out”; to experience on a cosmic 
level) and naturalize humanity (in order to mute feelings of self-denial) to remain faithful 
to the earth (Nietzsche 1926, § 443). 
 Simultaneously, Nietzsche's aim is to dehumanize nature in order to ground the self. 
Because, when nature has human – social – elements and speaks in human language, one 
is never alone in a psychological sense. Always human's social nature calls upon feelings 
and thought processes: It always calls upon responsibility. So he needs to immunize 
himself against natural elements which he perceives to have meaning, while he knows 
they actually do not have meaning. This positivist approach is necessary to be firmly 
grounded as a self, in order to be able to reach for a cosmological perspective. In other 
words, he needs something very firm to hold on to, in order to look up into the cosmos. 
And, what can be more firm than an inhuman, positivistic nature? Nietzsche realizes 
humanity needs solid ground underneath its feet, in order to be safe enough when one is 
looking outside of one's self. Because of this, the founding of a cosmological self is first of 
all a founding of the self in nature (Safranski 2002, p. 234). 
 However, the dehumanization of nature would be, in Heidegger's terms, a covering 
up of Being. When nature is regarded from the position of positivism, the human element 
in nature becomes obsolete: humanity becomes a measurable thing inside nature as well 
as all other entities. Being without the observer of Being, human, cannot happen. 
Heidegger might also say that Nietzsche's attempt to found the self is misguided, since it 
is already grounded. Nietzsche just forgot the self is grounded, because he tends to reject 
his own historical and metaphysical presuppositions, which might be perceived as the two 
most important grounds in Western history. This is probably what makes Nietzsche so 
powerful as well: he wants to incorporate that which is far (cosmos), to bring it closer into 
nature, as a condition of life. One needs a strong will to do this. 
 Basically, he called this will the “Will to Power”. The humanization of life in reaching 
out toward the cosmos, and the dehumanization of nature in a positivist approach to 
being, are not two separate things. They meet in the Will to Power: the principle that 
everything moves in order to achieve power. This is true for the tiniest grain of sand – the 
positivist nature – as well as in the most intense self-affirming feeling – the cosmos. All of 
it exists because it strives to power. The mode or method of this Will to Power is the 
eternal recurrence: everything strives for power as it did before and will do after. The Will 
to Power does not work linearly, in an Apollonian accumulation of power with a certain 
crescendo. Rather it works cyclically. Everything (physical, metaphysical, spiritual and even 
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passions (Nietzsche 1999, § 288)) will to incorporate what it is aimed at, as a condition of 
itself. In other words, everything tries to find itself in the Other (in cosmos), through the 
eternal recurrence of the same. Once more, everything endures and enhances, by 
strengthening its own foundation. Exactly this is what life is, enduring and enhancing, 
something which happens over and over again, powering itself to happen again and again. 
This eternal recurrence is the mode of the Will to Power. The Will to Power is thus self-
transcendence through self-preservation (the positivist) and self-enhancement (the 
cosmos). “You still want to create the world before which you can kneel: this is your final 
hope and intoxication” (Nietzsche 1883, second part “On Self-Transcendence”). To do this, 
one must strangely stay away from the Dionysian in a pathos of distance: One needs 
proper distance to judge the working of power in discourses, to perceive the veil of Maya 
in order to get an image of the Will to Power. This image of life rejects the human world of 
values, truth and meaning as we knew it before. Now, everything is Will to Power. Self-
preservation and self-enhancement eventually lead to a cosmological and naturalistic 
principle of Being and hence, to a new and all-encompassing metaphysical cause of Power. 
(Safranski 2002, p. 290) 
 To summarize, we saw how Nietzsche translates the Dionysian and Apollonian as 
the cosmological and positivist approach to life respectively. By doing this, he grounded 
the mythological gods in a psychological foundation. The cosmological approach is the 
enhancing factor of life; it is necessary for life to transcend beyond its borders and to 
grow. The positivist approach is the preserving factor of life; it is the ground from which 
enhancement can set out and take place. Enhancement sets out towards the cosmos from 
its positivist grounded preservation. Enhancement however, moves cyclically back into its 
own ground; it sets out to found itself in the cosmos, before returning to itself and 
strengthening its preservative ground. When we translate this into a more concrete 
organization theory, the cosmos can be seen as the organization of the outside world as 
we perceive it - “kosmos” being Greek for order. In other words, the cosmos is the macro-
level of society, how organizations relate to each other and strive for value. Yet, the 
cosmos and outside world are based on our own foundation in positivism, in that which we 
know for certain. Enhancing then, happens by trying to connect that which we perceive of 
the macro-level to what we know for certain.  Because the cosmos is purely based on how 
the outside order of the world is perceived (in a process which reduces chaos), the return 
to what we know is actually a return to the same; it feeds itself its own image of the 
outside world. Yet, the essence of this eternal recurrence is the accumulation of Power. 
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Power is the drive behind all our venturing out into the real world with our own truths. In 
the next paragraph, we will explore the inherent problems which accompany a 
metaphysics of Power. Heidegger will show us that the Will to Power is utterly 
unsatisfying, and that Nietzsche forgets to think truly ontologically. However, we have 
seen that Nietzsche has been tremendously important in Western thinking, since he 
rediscovered nature (the Dionysian) in our thinking. 
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4.5 Summary & Conclusions on Nietzsche 
 
 Before continuing with Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche, I will recapitulate 
Nietzsche thoughts, as explored in this chapter. I started by explaining how Nietzsche saw 
the entirety of Western philosophy (after Plato) as Apollonian. In other words, the 
interpretation of life in Western philosophy is enframing, structuring, reasonable and 
technological in nature. Therefore, Nietzsche intended to revive the Dionysian: the 
principle of chaos, ecstasy, the cosmos and nature. He intensely wanted these elements to 
be part of valid interpretations of life. To achieve this, he taught us that the Apollonian 
shows its face in the experience of thinking. So, philosophy's ideas are first and foremost a 
matter of thinking, a matter of the mind. The Dionysian however, is a matter of irregular 
feelings. These feelings should also be accounted for when explaining life by means of 
philosophy, since they exist. Therefore he finds that a cosmological point of view provides 
a Dionysian answer: the Dionysian is the immensity of the cosmos and the marvel of the 
diversity of life. Yet, the Apollonian needs to immunize us against the mistake of being 
overly emotional. The positivist movement thus provides an Apollonian answer: there is a 
certain quietism in viewing nature as lifeless, instead of projecting feelings unto it. Yet, 
both these “forces”, the positivist Apollonian and the cosmological Dionysian, meet in the 
Will to Power, since they cannot be separated in life but only in thought. The positivist 
Apollonian can be seen as the securing power, it enframes our world, thereby providing 
truths and stability to believe in. The cosmological Dionysian, on the other hand, 
withstands enframing by relating man to the immensity of life, which the Apollonian can 
never enframe totally. Eventually, both of them exist together to achieve a heightened 
sense of power in one's life. In a way, this Will to Power is enframing, because it powerfully 
structures the world. Thus, Nietzsche's addition to the concept of enframing, is his 
addition of feelings. Nietzsche showed us that enframing is not only a matter of 
Apollonian rationality, but that it also works by means of “natural” feelings (Dionysian). So, 
however much the Dionysian is a concept of anti-enframing, the encompassing concept of 
the Will to Power seems to have the characteristic goal of enframing yet again. We know 
this, because eventually, the enhancing aspect of the Will to Power (the Dionysian), is 
enhancement in order to be able to be secured (more powerfully). This movement is a 
concept which returns eternally out of itself (enhancing), but toward the same (securing). 
In this sense, the Dionysian is paradoxical. It signifies the enframing of feelings by means 
of the Will to Power. At the same time it also signifies the chaos of an uncaring nature. 
Perhaps the essential meaning of the Dionysian as chaotic is that it is not specifically either 
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enframing or chaotic.  
 To recapitulate, we analyzed Kierkegaard's philosophy and concluded that the 
world is enframed in terms of a series of choices with digital decisions (Either/Or). 
Kierkegaard's morale calls on us to repent for this enframing, of which we are part, while 
at the same time acknowledging that we cannot escape it. His method of repentance 
makes this possible by denying any validity of metaphysical claims. Only God knows the 
metaphysical truth. 
 Kierkegaard revived a religious possibility to relate to the enframing of the world. 
Nietzsche on the other hand, revived an aesthetic perspective which both organizes and 
disorganizes enframing (respectively the Apollonian and Dionysian). In our next chapter, 
we will see how Heidegger deals with his concept of enframing and how it follows from 
Nietzsche's “final metaphysics”. Heidegger will finally open the existential dimension, 
while turning away from Kierkegaard's religion as well as Nietzsche's mythos-inspired 
aesthetics. I will analyze why he turns away from these concepts, as well as provide a 
critique of his rejection of these pre-modern methods.
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5. Returning to the Nearest Question: Existentialism 
  
 So far, I would summarize Kierkegaard's addition to enframing as the explanation of 
the demanding choice of the Either/Or. There appears to be a definite need to choose 
between either of two choices during life. To “escape” this downward spiral into seemingly 
real choices, we should repent for the times we mistook these unreal and binary choices 
for the real choice of one's self.  Nietzsche's addition to enframing lies in the validation of 
erratic feelings in experiencing life next to reasonable thinking. This validation happens by 
means of the cosmological perspective, which leads us to awe in a way which disallows 
belief in reason alone anymore. The difference between Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, in this 
sense, lies in Kierkegaard's ethic approach, which tells us that one can only do good in 
what I would call the microcosmos of one's own life, versus Nietzsche's aesthetic and 
macrocosmic life-experience. These oppositions between microcosmos (the local life) and 
macrocosmos (the global life) might seem unbridgeable. Yet, this choice between local 
and global seems to present itself as an Either/Or, which means it might not be a real 
difference, only an apparent one. In this chapter, I will finally discuss the inventor of the 
concept of enframing itself, Heidegger. Heidegger agrees with his “existential father” 
Kierkegaard about the importance of the microcosmos by heavily criticizing Nietzsche's 
metaphysical orientation towards the higher. He argues that Nietzsche, however 
suspicious he might have been, is still a metaphysician. Heidegger would argue that 
Nietzsche does not escape Plato's higher metaphysical thinking, but merely turns it upside 
down. To explain more clearly how Heidegger sees Nietzsche's role in the history of 
enframing, I will begin by reviewing Heidegger's critique on Nietzsche. First of all, 
Heidegger shows how metaphysics always incorporates an essence of nihilism. This means 
that metaphysics has always run away from the valueless bleakness which is reality (as we 
would experience it) into a realm beyond reality. We noticed a similar escapism in 
Kierkegaard's aesthetic (A's) metaphysics when we talked about the opera as an 
interruption of life. After this, I will show how Heidegger sees truth as well as art in 
Nietzsche's writing, as parts of enframing. Thirdly, we will return to the Will to Power and 
the difference between Heidegger's existential approach and Nietzsche's metaphysical 
one. Eventually, I will conclude with a critical note on Heidegger's method of thought. 
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5.1 The Limits of Nietzsche's Thinking 
 
 In our previous chapter on Nietzsche, we explored the Will to Power, which e x-
plains how enframing came to power by means of rational thought and sensible expe-
riences. The arrival of the Will to Power however, rips apart meaningful ways of phi-
losophy, since it interprets the entire history of the (metaphysical) enframing by phi-
losophy as (rational) power-play.  In other words, ideas other than power are not sus-
tainable anymore, even the most beautiful and just philosophical  functions such as 
Will to Power. The same happens to religion; first and foremost, religious truth has the 
function of keeping the masses satisfied and content by providing them with a docile 
concept like repentance. This dominance of the power perspective eventually leads to 
its own destruction, because it leads to the insight of nihilism; metaphysical philos o-
phy (including the Will to Power) exists only as an image, because we are dissatisfied 
with reality and unceasingly will to establish power over reality (aka enframing).  
 Heidegger's critique of Nietzsche sheds light on his value as well as his lack. He 
shows us that Nietzsche's self-transcendence overturned metaphysics by revealing the 
repressed meaninglessness which is part of any metaphysics. This meaninglessness is 
caused by the fact that metaphysics turns away from life, from nature and thus from 
Dionysus in creating some structure. Yet, Nietzsche also showed us that feelings could be 
used in the same enframing way. Feelings can also be used in a metaphysical way, when 
they are viewed from a distance and analyzed as usable “objects”. Through this distance, 
Nietzsche seems to be under the impression he is affirming life. Yet, his metaphysics could 
not actually be life-affirming in its fullest sense, since metaphysics is never life affirming, 
according to Heidegger. Rather, metaphysics needs to create a representation of life, 
which improves our image of life, thereby denying certain parts of life itself in favor of 
better images. These metaphysical images of life are constructed by the Will to Power. We 
have analyzed how the eternal cycle of stabilization and enhancement works in the 
previous chapters. 
 Where Kierkegaard's choice lies before the Either/Or as a whole, Nietzsche's choice 
seems to lie in the Neither/Nor. This Neither/Nor points to an ultimate discomfort with life, 
because all values have become meaningless. The Dionysian allows us to deal with the 
injustice of fate, yet it is still a metaphysical image of life, which Heidegger loathes. In 
other words, the metaphysical image of life is always located beyond life, in the frame of a 
system in which one creates a structure and believes that life works that way. 
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 So, Nietzsche essential mood  of life seems to be discomfort. He appears to be 
extremely uncomfortable because he cannot seem to escape metaphysics, so he sets out 
to “revalue all values” by means of the Will to Power. The Will to Power is meant as the 
final metaphysics, which can be seen as a conclusion to the history of the west and 
philosophy: “all gods must die”. The Will to Power is not only a new metaphysical 
interpretation of life. Rather, it is the metaphysical interpretation of all metaphysics, which 
Nietzsche called the Revaluation of all values. It ends here, because the metaphysical 
image is apparently never enough to live life well. The fact that all metaphysics can be 
interpreted as Will to Power (in favor of its own content), means that there never was 
anything truly essential about metaphysics. In one word this is called nihilism, but it is a 
specific kind of nihilism. Heidegger distinguishes between two kinds of nihilism (Heidegger 
1977, p. 104). On the one hand, we have completed nihilism. This form of nihilism is 
indeed nihilism as a completed event and a conclusion of history. On the other hand, 
nihilism can be understood as an ongoing event in western history and even as the inner 
logic of the west. In this sense, the entire ideological-philosophical tradition is aimed at its 
own destruction, heralded by the birth of the Will to Power, which Nietzsche explained as 
implicit in every metaphysic (Heidegger 1977, p. 54). In other words, Nietzsche uncovers 
the Will to Power as a hidden dimension in all metaphysics, thereby destroying every 
metaphysical system. The essential question however, is raised by Nietzsche in his Gay 
Science, aphorism 125 of the Madman, which is probably the most over-quoted aphorism 
of Nietzsche by his hand: 
 
Have you not heard of that madman who lit a lantern in the bright morning hours, ran to the 
market place, and cried incessantly: "I seek God! I seek God!"—As many of those who did not 
believe in God were standing around just then, he provoked much laughter. Has he got lost? 
asked one. Did he lose his way like a child? asked another. Or is he hiding? Is he afraid of us? 
Has he gone on a voyage? emigrated?—Thus they yelled and laughed. 
The madman jumped into their midst and pierced them with his eyes. "Whither is God?" he 
cried; "I will tell you. We have killed him—you and I. All of us are his murderers. But how did we 
do this? How could we drink up the sea? Who gave us the sponge to wipe away the entire 
horizon? What were we doing when we unchained this earth from its sun? Whither is it moving 
now? Whither are we moving? Away from all suns? Are we not plunging continually? Backward, 
sideward, forward, in all directions? Is there still any up or down? Are we not straying as 
through an infinite nothing? Do we not feel the breath of empty space? Has it not become 
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colder? Is not night continually closing in on us? Do we not need to light lanterns in the 
morning? Do we hear nothing as yet of the noise of the gravediggers who are burying God? Do 
we smell nothing as yet of the divine decomposition? Gods, too, decompose. God is dead. God 
remains dead. And we have killed him. 
"How shall we comfort ourselves, the murderers of all murderers? What was holiest and 
mightiest of all that the world has yet owned has bled to death under our knives: who will 
wipe this blood off us? What water is there for us to clean ourselves? What festivals of 
atonement, what sacred games shall we have to invent? Is not the greatness of this deed too 
great for us? Must we ourselves not become gods simply to appear worthy of it? There has 
never been a greater deed; and whoever is born after us—for the sake of this deed he will 
belong to a higher history than all history hitherto." 
 Nietzsche is shocked by the discovery that metaphysics has come to an end by its 
own insufficience. Sadly, mankind does not understand what the death of God means, 
while at the same time living through the event. Continuing: 
 
Here the madman fell silent and looked again at his listeners; and they, too, were silent and 
stared at him in astonishment. At last he threw his lantern on the ground, and it broke into 
pieces and went out. "I have come too early," he said then; "my time is not yet. This tremendous 
event is still on its way, still wandering; it has not yet reached the ears of men. Lightning and 
thunder require time; the light of the stars requires time; deeds, though done, still require time 
to be seen and heard. This deed is still more distant from them than the most distant stars and 
yet they have done it themselves." 
It has been related further that on the same day the madman forced his way into several 
churches and there struck up his requiem aeternam deo. Led out and called to account, he is 
said always to have replied nothing but: "What after all are these churches now if they are not 
the tombs and sepulchers of God?" 
 
According to Heidegger, even Nietzsche himself does not make the right movement 
concerning the death of God: Being remains unthought of even by Nietzsche (Heidegger 
1977, p. 58). Nietzsche turns metaphysics upside down, yet the essential question (the 
question concerning Being) remains hidden: the question concerning Being. Once the 
question concerning Being is asked, we will see that we already passed the era of nihilism, 
because nihilism is the time when nothing (nihil) happens to Being. Nihilism as event – the 
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devaluation of the true, good and beautiful – has been completed. Yet, somehow, nihilism 
has a defensive vehemence  (Heidegger 1977, p. 65, 66). Man often attempts to escape 
nihilism without actually revaluing his values. This way, nihilism becomes a pessimistic 
suffering from which we try to escape, which actually makes the problem of nihilism even 
more acute (Nietzsche 1980, aphorism 28). We see this often whenever values are 
declining: We run, try to hold on to them, to construct them further and to find more 
ideals to ground them. We try to cover it up with gloss and so-called beautifications, make-
overs and other cosmetic surgeries on organizational as well as personal level. Rather, 
according to Nietzsche and Heidegger, the task is to take nihilism as something positive, 
something constructive, which can only be done by revaluing all values. Nietzsche's effort 
to do this was the Will to Power. 
 When nihilism is completed as historical process,  there is only one thing we still 
need to do, in order to take nihilism as constructive power for revaluing: we need to get 
rid of the place of values. Metaphysics has always given more importance to God, in 
heaven, while not valuing our place on earth. In order to gain existential importance, we 
need to get rid of the throne of God, so to speak. Otherwise, some value will  take over 
power again, repeating the whole cycle of nihilism. At this point, according to Heidegger, 
Nietzsche fails: Nietzsche's revaluation still happens inside of metaphysics, namely in the 
preservation and enhancement of life as the new leading metaphysical concept  
(Heidegger 1977, p. 73). Hence, Nietzsche “merely” turns metaphysics upside down, he 
does not (or cannot) overcome it, since he is bound to his analysis of it as Will to Power 
inside the “subjective” tradition of metaphysics. 
 Nietzsche's victory lies in the Will to Power as well, but in a different sense. The 
epitome of metaphysics, namely the Will to Power, now occurs consciously out of its own 
principle: now we know that any metaphysics actually works as Will to Power, so we are 
conscious about the power principle of any metaphysical theory. Any metaphysics 
attempts to have power over those who become weak because of this power. Life cannot 
be about honor, safety, profit or value anymore, since power precedes all as the panacea 
of super abundant life. Yet, of course, sometimes power still hides as value or profit or 
whatever value we put upon the throne of god. The Will to Power as a conscious principle 
though, entails a commanding. One commands something to dispose itself in reality – this 
we call change; it is a gathering together of nature at our disposal, for instance by the 
saving of the energy of the sun, in order to unleash that energy elsewhere and at a 
different time to change something. Metaphorically, we manufacture handles unto 
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anything natural, in order to grasp and use it as we see fit. Kierkegaard sees the will as 
want (as we saw in the paragraph Fake Desire), that is why he is able to argue that the will 
already has what it wills. There is nothing transcending about the will in a religious sense. 
Willing as Power however, wills in a commanding way for its own self-preservation and 
self-enhancement, in order to gain power over oneself. Willing signifies a positing of 
conditions for reality and therefore overreaching. Today, we recognize this overreaching in 
our world of organizations. Organizations in this sense are synonymous to gathering 
together, to willing-commanding, in a branch-like system of top-down and bottom-up 
power-relations. These gatherings where willing-commanding happens are generally 
called meetings, in which decisions are made concerning a certain commodity. Central to 
all modern metaphysics and thus to the metaphysics of organizations is the aim to assure a 
basis of substance on which the physical as well as the immaterial world as we know it is 
built, according to Heidegger  (Heidegger 1977, p. 82). The method of certainty is called 
truth. Truth is definitely not something which one can do without, for there has to be a 
content of certainty to believe in. Thus, metaphysics becomes the job of people who value 
truth and certainty above all other things. The subject, as gathering together of Willing-
commands (also known as enframing) and therefore as the epitome of certainty in modern 
times, becomes the pinnacle of the Will to Power  (Heidegger 1977, p. 83). The Will to 
Power is constantly making the subject substantial in modern times. 
  To sum up, we can see how Nietzsche both triumphs and fails with the Will to 
Power as the eventual method of metaphysics. He wins because now, the Will to Power 
can only be used consciously in the making of a metaphysical system. It can no longer be 
subsumed under a different concept. In other words, every system of thought will have to 
take power into account. Every system of thought will have to justify itself in terms of 
power. There is no way of ignoring power anymore. Nietzsche's failure lies in this same 
fact; once there is no way to ignore power, believing in any other value becomes excruciat-
ingly difficult. To believe, one has to “forget” about being subject to power. But, the death 
of God always reminds us of what kind of power we have. We killed God! We might not 
know what to do with that fact, but it does reveal what powerful beings we are, whether 
consciously or subconsciously. This revelation is what leads to nihilism, which is the loss of 
the inherent validity of values. Obviously we always have had the power to kill God; we just 
did not perceive it. 
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5.2 The Consummation of Nature 
 
 In the previous chapter, I explored Nietzsche's destructive metaphysical 
perspective. In this chapter, I will analyze how his destructive perspective functions i n 
the consummation of nature by projecting an image of power unto it. By calling the 
Will to Power an “image” which is “projected”, one could say I am questioning the 
power of the Will to Power. Eventually, the Will to Power is “attached” to whatever 
concept strives to gain power. Yet, the validity of the concept can never be dodged, 
since even when we do not believe in the power of the Will to Power, we believe in 
another powerful concept.  This is how the Will to Power inescapably enframes us and 
our “natural” world (in terms of power). The Will to Power, Kierkegaard might say, 
only exists in illusionary choices. Nietzsche however, feels this will is the metaphysical 
foundation of all time, simply because there is no escaping its illusionary character.  
 Heidegger's way of sensing is a sensing of something which comes forth and 
presents itself to us; something which opens itself to our perceiving. Self-consciousness 
(as the upkeep and enhancement of the subject) and thus the consciousness of Power, 
essentially make the world into a dead object, according to Heidegger. Rather a dead 
object than one which has power over us, might Nietzsche have said. The dehumanization 
of nature is also not something Heidegger is happy about. The positivist approach is rather 
an assault to Being, forcing the earth to present itself as unconditional objectification. 
Nature consists of dead things, so there is no hold for morality anymore to tell us not to 
use every part of it we can. “The time is coming when the struggle for dominion over the 
earth will be carried on. It will be carried on in the name of fundamental philosophical 
doctrines” (Heidegger 1977, p. 101), like, obviously, the Will to Power. The struggle for 
dominion over earth can occur because history is already in the mode of the Will to Power 
(nihilism as metaphysics turned upside down) without being recognized as such. The 
subject drives towards its own consummation in its drunken haze of power. Nietzsche 
showed us that willing is making conscious of its own power about itself, which happens in 
objectification, because in objectification the subject-object relationship is clear cut and 
simplistic: I am the subject and I use the object, like we saw, without any moral scruples. So 
the late metaphysics is about making conscious of itself through organizing (stabilizing 
and enhancing). Through this process the subject consumes itself as more subject and 
eventually as Übermensch. So metaphysics has something reflective, as will reflecting on 
will on the best way to continue willing. 
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 Paraphrasing Heidegger: “So, in this time of Will to Power, what is happening to 
Being?”  (Heidegger 1977, p. 102) With Nietzsche, Being has become a value, since every-
thing presents itself as value in the view of the Will to Power. A value can differ in power 
from other values. Nietzsche found Being as a value to be the highest gift you can grant 
Being, since it allows humans to expressly grasp Being (the most powerful value) and 
make themselves out of it. Heidegger does not agree with this perspective however, since 
this would mean that the Will to Power is but a condition of Being. This would actually be 
the hiding of Being instead of revealing it, since Being is the most fundamental question; 
the question concerning Being is simply the question of “what is?”. However close Nie-
tzsche comes to this question, he never experienced Being (Heidegger 1977, p. 104); he 
never thought in an existential way. Eventually, nothing happens to Being in Nietzsche's 
thinking, and in the entire philosophical tradition for that matter. Apparently, Heidegger 
says, thinking in terms of values is nihilism itself, since nothing happens to Being in this 
thinking. Hence, for Heidegger, Nietzsche did not think existentially, nor did he experience 
Being at any point. Value-thinking is the essence of the turning around of nihilism. The 
overcoming of nihilism actually means consummation of nihilism, which I will analyze in the 
next chapter. 
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5.3 Technology and the Response-ability of Reply 
 
 In the previous chapter, we explored Nietzsche's limits according to Heidegger. 
These limits consist of the inescapable definition that all ideas strive to become more 
powerful; “money”, for instance, has gotten more and more powerful the last couple 
of centuries. Metaphysics has been occupied, throughout our history, with making 
concepts more powerful by perfecting them. According to Heidegger, this was a 
mistake, because metaphysics should have questioned experiences closer to Being by 
asking: what do we relate to in the first place? The answer to this question in our time, 
according to Heidegger, would be that we generally relate to what we experience in a 
practical-enframing way. Yet, there is an alternative. 
 Thus, unlike other – metaphysical – philosophers, Heidegger returns to the question 
of the ground of any and all metaphysics, namely the question concerning Being 
(Heidegger 2008, p. 23). The word Being is, however, a difficult one to grasp: what does 
Being mean, exactly? One needs to keep in mind that our confusion at this word and his 
language in general is exactly what Heidegger intends. Heidegger questions certain ideas 
we never questioned ourselves, making us blind for the full meaning of the words we use. 
By Being he actually means all things which are near us, all things and us, here, in time and 
our understanding of this nearness (Visser 1989, p. 77). The question concerning Being 
seems like a self-evident question then, since we are always near the things we are near; 
we are always with the things surrounding us. However true this may be, history shows us 
that the question concerning Being is absolutely not self-evident and unnecessary. Like 
the history of philosophy and perhaps our own personal history shows us, human beings 
are extremely capable at being at different places than where they actually, “physically”, 
are, whether in fantasies or through technological mass-media. So the language 
Heidegger employs with regard to Being is not merely an impressive philosophical show of 
neologisms; its function is to make us stop skipping over ourselves and to interrupt us from 
our inbred habits. Heidegger seems to think these verbal habits (we call concepts) are 
metaphysically enframed to be “universally valid”. 
 What makes us skip over ourselves all the time, then? What is this power which has 
the ability to let us be ahead of ourselves all the time? In accordance with The Question 
concerning Technology, the answer to this question is also technology. More specifically, 
the answer to this question is our use of technology while not knowing what we are using. 
While metaphysics attempts to create an essence for us to believe in, the enframing of 
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technology in modern times seems to be the forgetting of an essence in order to simply 
use instruments. Heidegger reminds us that the essence of technology is nothing techno-
logical. Neither is this essence of technology some anthropological, social or metaphysical 
essence. Essence, namely, does not mean essentia here; essence does not refer to some 
essential part, but rather to that which endures in technology. According to Heidegger, this 
enduring aspect of technology has nothing to do with technology itself: the process of 
enframing just wants us to think that the essence of technology is technological in nature. 
Yet, something only has essence when it has the power to endure. This seems like a view 
Nietzsche would heartily agree with, although he might define the enduring thing as a 
symptom of power, as we saw before. So, the question concerning the essence of tech-
nology is a question towards what in technology endures. For Heidegger the essence, that 
which endures of technology, is not something technological, as we saw. But how can that 
be? What is the enduring essence of technology, then? In a way, the answer is obvious: it is 
man who endures, and, more truthfully: it is the subject who endures. This subject (subiec-
tum, hypokeimenon1) (Heidegger 1977, p. 128) establishes a relation to the world and is, 
very realistically, the enduring foundation on which the technological representation of 
the world is built. To get to the essence of technology however, the subject needs to de-
velop a freestanding relation with technology. Because, how can we get to the essence of 
something when we cannot think about it freely, without the thing influencing our very 
thinking of it? Heidegger defines freedom in a spatial way, namely as freestanding. We 
need to be at a distance from technology to be able to see its essence clearly; to be able to 
oversee it. That might be the main reason why Heidegger did most of his thinking in a cab-
in in the forest. When human himself is caught in the technological system of praxis – 
which always has a goal outside of itself – it becomes very hard to keep a freestanding re-
lation to it. 
 To analyze the essence of technology, Heidegger re-examines the modes of techno-
logical thinking, namely causality in all its forms. His interpretation of these modes of cau-
sality is remarkable, since he searches for this definition within the ancient Greeks and not 
within the modern Newtonian model of causality. He defines causality as responsibility. This 
responsibility is nothing moralistic: it is an occasioning responsibility, a crafting responsibil-
ity. It is “Starting something on its way into arrival, an inducing to go forward” (Heidegger 
1977, p. 9). According to Heidegger, this inducing forward and occasioning is how the 
Greeks experienced the concept of causality. They did not experience causality as a natural 
  
1 Both translate as persisting underlying substance, hence enduring. 
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physical reaction of forces. The Newtonian type of causality lays claim to an objective reali-
ty outside of us, while the Greek causality includes the experiencing subject into the 
“equation”. Causality as responsibility – the Object's ability to response instead of just being 
an image – resides in poiesis, in the poietic work of bringing something forth for its own 
sake. One would probably not be surprised that this bringing forth for its own sake is the 
destiny of the arts in the aesthetic realm (Heidegger 1977, p. 116). It seems very different 
from a regular organizational discourse, in which work ought to have practical value. How 
else can you measure your work, the work of your company and of your subordinates, than 
through practical results? This is, of course, very true. However, poiesis, whatever we 
might be inclined to believe, is not something accidental or random, in the sense that it 
happens only in an artist's dream or in coincidences. Poiesis has a different responsibility 
than this enframing, the latter which attempts to capture the subject in an organizational 
responsibility-thinking. Where the responsibility of praxis urges human to challenge others 
and nature to measurable results, the responsibility of poiesis is a responsibility of reply, of 
a reaction in language. 
 Let us go back to our initial question: The question concerning the essence of tech-
nology. Heidegger’s analysis and method of questioning deals with finding out the truth 
about technology. It should not be a surprise that truth in existentialism is not the truth of 
factual correctness. This correctness would only be possible within a certain procedural 
discourse, where we can measure our findings. Correctness only has meaning in a setting 
in which man needs to follow protocol. But, as we saw, Heidegger aims at a freestanding 
questioning of an essence. When we reach and complete this freestanding questioning, 
truth is “merely” technology showing itself to us in its essence. We explored before that 
contrary to metaphysical attempts to create an essence, the enframing effect of technol-
ogy, attempts to hide an essence. Truth in this sense is the revealing of this hiding: to 
catch enframing in the act. Truth “as correctness” may have become obsolete with Nie-
tzsche, who opened up the realm of suspicion for us, thereby showing us the actual power 
mechanisms in truth as correctness. Let us see whether Heidegger escapes similar suspi-
cion. 
 So far we noticed how Heidegger returns to a question forgotten by metaphysics, 
namely the question concerning Being. With this question, he intends to return to our 
roots, to our own environment, contrary to the abstract systems of thought. Returning to 
our environment, he realizes Being in our time is hidden behind technology; technology is 
everywhere around us and is our normal mode of living, while Being is, yet again, nowhere 
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to be found. So the question concerning the oblivion of Being becomes the question con-
cerning technology in our time. He then searches for the essence of technology in order to 
understand our time better. This essence of technology lies not in technology itself, but in 
our use of nature and the world. When taking a free-standing perspective on technology, 
he finds that there are two ways to use objects: one of which is the enframing of praxis, 
the other the aesthetic response-ability of poiesis.  
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5.4 Truth and Concealment 
 
 Thus, in contrast to Nietzsche’s far away metaphysics, Heidegger examines what 
is near us. Heidegger defines the way we relate to our environment in our modern era 
as a way in which we expect everything near us (from objects, to values, to our bodies) 
to be immediately ready for use. Yet, the truth about this immediate usability  is a par-
adoxical one: uncovering the fact that everything should be made usable disables the 
usability itself. In other words, when observing objects in order to understand them 
instead of using them, we actually notice how strange it is that we are not using them. 
The truth about the technological usability of things, therefore, reveals the modern 
paradoxical frame of technology in which we are generally caught. 
 Truth is hence synonymous to revealing. When we look at technology truthfully, it 
will un-cover its essence before us. Becoming transparent, as Kierkegaard found an essen-
tial part of a true choice, also seems to be the essence of Heidegger’s truthful questioning. 
So, the truth about technology refers to a revealing of the essence of technology; a be-
coming transparent of technology. But does not technology itself reveal something as 
well? We can see how technology works, can we not? The image technology wants us to 
see is however not a truthful revealing, but rather a concealing. Modern technology's con-
cealing movement is a Nietzschean way of concealing: it enframes us, so we will not be 
able to see outside of the frame anymore. In modern technology, nature is called upon to 
present itself as how we imagined nature. Nature is not revealed for the sake of nature, 
but for the sake of being usable and practical by us, which happens through science and 
research. Exactly this is what modern and mechanized technology entails. I feel therefore 
that modern technology is essentially capitalistic, since it treats nature as commodity, 
which can be stockpiled to provide maximum yield at a minimum of expense. Hence the 
sun can be stored and kept until man decides to unleash its power (Heidegger 1977, p. 15). 
The horizon can be placed where ever we feel the need to represent things. The sea can 
be made land and land can be made sea. The secret of nature (its energy) can be unlocked 
and transformed, stored and distributed as we see fit (H16). We notice here the securing 
and regulating tendencies we noticed before in metaphysics. Now we finally secured the 
subject, unlocking the possibility to equalize object & nature, because now the subject is 
the ground on which the equalizing takes place. In our technological society, nature is not 
a big question mark anymore: nature has been secured. In this process, we secure not only 
our subjectness, but also the objectness of the world. The withstanding and immensely 
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different Object becomes the domesticated object: we manufacture handles or points of 
entry on every object we could not carry naturally. I would argue that we normally assure 
ourselves that any object can only exist as practical, usable object, after which we can in-
sure ourselves against any other possibility. Insurance is the securing of those moments 
we essentially cannot secure. It is an enframed process, in the sense that there is no genu-
ine thinking or reflection involved, only stockpiling and reproduction to make chances of 
exception smaller. In this light, the financial crisis seems less and less unlikely an event: 
unlimited stockpiling in an enframed discourse eventually leads to a breakdown, since the 
earth's resources are not as unlimited as believed in the enframed discourse. 
 Nevertheless, are there ways to reveal what is happening in technology from a free-
standing point of view? The unconcealment of truth cannot be brought about by mere 
subjects; it would be too great a task for anyone. “The fact that the real has been showing 
itself in the light of Ideas ever since the time of Plato, Plato did not bring about. The think-
er only responded to what addressed itself to him.” (Heidegger 1977, p. 18) This also 
stands in line with Heidegger's description of responsibility, as we saw before. The respon-
sibility of poiesis is a responsibility of reply. Poiesis is not meant to judge Plato for not 
thinking existentially. Rather, a poietic interpretation can explain why Plato did not think 
existentially. In this way we will understand more about our own time as well. The only 
foundation for a humane society would be a focus on the truth as poiesis, with the respon-
sibility of reply as “action-framework”. 
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5.5 Enframing (Das Gestell) 
 
 Truth is thus, according to Heidegger, a mode of revealing what is actually hap-
pening. It is a poietic mode through which we bring the effects of a system to light, 
instead of forcing a certain truth into a frame. We already saw why poiesis is important; 
only poiesis has a direct relationship with the essence of technology, because it re-
veals the process of enframing from the outside of its structure in order to perceive 
exactly what is happening. This technological “usability -framework” is called Das 
Gestell by Heidegger. On the one hand, enframing signifies the mood of global usabil-
ity. On the other hand, enframing points to the demand on man to make the world and 
its objects usable. Enframing is thus truly a frame which enframes man.  
 So, the core benefit of an existential approach is the revealing function of truth, 
versus the enframing need to make Being into standing reserve, made ready to be at our 
command at all times. An existential approach allows Being to come forward, instead of 
enframing it. Let us first go back into history and analyze how Being has been experienced 
before. Being has been hidden and subsumed under metaphysics for a very long time. As 
we saw before, the reason metaphysics could destroy itself, was because of nihilism. Nihil-
ism in Heidegger's interpretation means that metaphysics and history were never about 
Being. Therefore, with the destruction of metaphysics, we lost nothing essential. Meta-
physics was destined to destroy itself, for it was only meant to keep the powerful in posi-
tions of power, I would argue. The Will to Power uncovered metaphysics for what it really 
was, from within. In other words, metaphysics never touched Being itself, while it claimed 
to search for Being everywhere. Simultaneously, however, Being came into presence as 
metaphysics, or as nature, during a huge part of our history. Why is this so, when meta-
physics was never about Being? Basically, whenever things are experienced as being near 
our heart and people understand this nearness in a certain way, we can speak about Being. 
Furthermore, we cannot claim that people never experienced God, Power, nature or other 
metaphysical concepts as being close to them. In Christianity, even God becomes personal. 
So, Being was always there during metaphysics, yet it is never understood as Being. The 
moment God (or any metaphysical concept) is experienced as nearness, is the moment the 
historical process of nihilism begins, since it is the nearness and our understanding of it 
which is important, and not God. So, eventually, Being presents itself by its hiding as met-
aphysical concept. This presencing of Being is a hiding-coming-to-presence, concealing it-
self to man as something (values, God), but never as what it is (unconcealed Being). 
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Heidegger calls this enframing (das Gestell). 
 Where nihilism is the essence of metaphysics, enframing is the essence of technol-
ogy. Metaphysics, in this sense, is the preliminary stage of technology. First, the process of 
historical nihilism has to be completed. When it is completed, Being can finally reveal itself. 
Yet, the meaning of the revelation of Being is its own hiding-coming-to-presence in tech-
nology. Basically, after the death of God, Being shows us it will be hidden again in the pro-
cess of enframing. So, there is no clear-cut, clean revelation of Being. At least, not for a 
long time to come, if ever. By the coming to presence of technology, something is obvi-
ously revealed to us. Yet the way technology reveals itself has never been an unconceal-
ment of Being. Technology is as the mythical Maya’s Veil or as a woman’s make-up, 
through which she shows something, while she hides the essence of what is underneath. 
Let us point out that Heidegger does not describe enframing moralistically; there is noth-
ing good or bad to it; but it is essential to Being in our time. 
 
Enframing means the gathering together of that setting-upon which sets upon man, i.e., chal-
lenges him forth, to reveal the real, in the mode of ordering, as standing reserve. Enframing 
means that way of revealing which holds sway in the essence of modern technology and which 
is itself nothing technological. (Heidegger 1977, p. 20) 
 
 Again, one should notice Heidegger’s peculiar use of language. I would argue that 
his use of language is peculiar, purely and solely because we are used to a more enframing 
way of speaking. Heidegger deliberately and necessarily breaks open our enframed use of 
language, to establish a Turning (Kehre) towards poiesis. In the translation of the quote 
above, we notice that first of all enframing is a gathering together. What does enframing 
gather together then? It gathers together a certain frame with a hooking point which 
hooks man (Stellen). In other words, man is called forward to his boss, to reveal reality, but 
in a specific mode, namely the mode of praxis, an assembly of stocked usability (Heidegger 
1977, p. 22). In this sense, man is a soldier of practical change in the world. Yet, since tech-
nology works how it works, namely as enframing, there can be no real change inside of its 
discourse. 
 The essence of technology lies in the meaning, revealed by the Kehre, of setting-
upon (Stellen). This meaning is in the sense of poiesis, because in truth das Gestell cannot 
be something enframing. If it were, life would have already found its completion in the 
perfect organization of humanity and accumulation of science and technology. In 
90 
Heidegger we see a maturing of the Nietzschean suspicion of the meaninglessness of 
practical progress: It is not that progress itself is meaningless, but progress purely within 
enframing is never progress. Progress lies in the Kehre. So when Heidegger says, “modern 
technology reveals the real as standing-reserve” (Heidegger 1977, p. 21), it is both a de-
scription of its essential working as technology as well as a free-standing rendition on that 
working in our reading of that particular sentence. Because, when the essence of technol-
ogy is expressed in language, we are able to free ourselves from a unilateral interpretation 
(which was hidden to us, just like Apollo was hidden before the creation of Dionysus) and 
come to the interpretation of poiesis. Hence, “language is the house of Being”. 
 To recapitulate about Heidegger and this paragraph in particular, we saw that in 
metaphysics, nothing ever happened to Being. Through the entire history of metaphysics, 
Being was used in an enframing manner to create systems of thought. These systems of 
thought were, however, experienced as very immense and close to humanity. This immen-
sity and closeness is Being showing itself while hidden behind some concept of thought. 
When metaphysics was completed by means of historical nihilism, Being showed itself in 
modern technology. The difference between metaphysics and modern technology is 
hence that we can be aware that Being is hidden inside modern technology. The essence 
of modern technology makes it possible to experience the enframing. During metaphysi-
cal times, this was not possible, since metaphysics involved universal structures, which 
man could not escape or turn around, until of course, Nietzsche did that very thing, herald-
ing the end of metaphysics and the beginning of existentialism. In fact, Kierkegaard her-
alded existentialism as well, by emphasizing the individual's choice, based on the individu-
al's experience and mood. This allows for an escape for the individual of the absolute sys-
tem, hence also opening up the existential Kehre towards poiesis. 
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5.6 The Danger & Redeeming Power 
 
 Enframing (Das Gestell) is thus what Heidegger calls the process of storing 
nature, i.e. in batteries or other commodities, in order to use it whenever we see fit. 
This process of modern technology is a dangerous undertaking. Eventually, nature will 
not be able to sustain the frame in which we live. Heidegger therefore searches for 
ways to escape this totalitarian enframing. Paradoxically, he discovers this redeeming 
power in the same place where lies the danger, namely in the process of enframing. 
The uncovering power of truth is necessary in order to perceive the enframing process 
justly. So, when we look at technological enframing from an outsider’s perspective, we 
can judge it justly instead of being its slave. However, this is not a critique of 
technology as much as it is a critique of humans’ enframing ways.  
 So, versus the ordering forth of enframing, the poietic destines (Heidegger 1977, p. 
25). This destining is a subtle invitation into an open space, in order to be able to reply. So, 
can we conclude it is simply a matter of choice between two extremes of a duality, 
practical enframing versus poiesis? Is it perhaps only a choice between the practical ethical 
versus the poietic aesthetic? Yet, as we saw, for Kierkegaard, true choice occurs before the 
either/or and not between the either and the or. It would then be a misinterpretation of 
Being, were we to say that Heideggerian existentialism would be a rejection of technical 
use and machinery in favor of an aesthetic – destining – approach to human existence. This 
misinterpretation is not so much about it being an incorrect interpretation of life. Rather, 
this dualism would be another creation of metaphysics, because of its creation of 
absolutes, and therefore, as Nietzsche shows us, fundamentally a disregard of its own 
power and a concealing of Being. What this means is that any metaphysics which aims to 
be constructive, historically valid, thus powerful, needs to close its eye towards its inner 
workings of power. When it discovers its own workings of power, it eventually self-
destructs. This is the reason metaphysics ended with the process of nihilism and why, in 
The Age of the World Picture, Heidegger tells us “When this occurs, then the gods have fled” 
(Heidegger 1977, p. 117), where “this” refers to the degradation of man's inner – 
metaphysical – relation to god into “mere religious experience”; in other words, the 
completed process of nihilism. 
 Man's final delusion is this fallacy of dualism: it is the idea that “man everywhere 
93 
and always encounters only himself” (Heidegger 1977, p. 27). This egological2 error tells 
man he is the only one who can decide which direction to take, which road to travel. It 
refers to the all-encompassing idea of autonomy: man can decide his own destiny, 
everything has “gathered together” and is at the ready for man to carve out his ideal 
reality. In this gathering together, the powerful practical side of the praxis-poiesis dualism 
is obviously the better choice. To even consider an aesthetic, goal-in-itself, course of action 
would feel like treason to the idea of an autonomous identity, since it would signify that 
autonomy is not all-encompassing. But, knowing the technological claim for what it is – 
enframing – man can never encounter only himself, since he is the one spoken to, hence he 
eksists from without of himself into the world. How can one find only oneself when one is 
revealed from out-of-within?  It is possible only as a grave mistake. The compelling 
enframing is that which conceals itself like this idea of autonomy, and thus also prohibits 
truth. Since the essence of technology has nothing to do with technology, but with truth 
as revealing, the threat does not lie in the working of the machinery and the use of 
technology itself. The danger lies in the fact that man could lose his possibility to perceive 
Being more originally, i.e. poietic. In other – organizational – words, man might become 
stuck inside a discourse, without any possibility to open it up and take a step back towards 
freedom. Man might become someone who only “exists” in the language of the system, 
like we saw in George Orwell’s 1984 and Aldous Huxley’s A Brave New World. Unlike these 
books show however, the danger lies in the disguising of it (Heidegger 1977, p. 37). We do 
not realize we are in danger and that is the danger itself. Perhaps this is also why the great 
tragedies of our time (The World Wars, for instance) could have happened and why 
Heidegger wrote most of his work on technology in the years after World War II. 
 On the other hand, Heidegger claims that the redeeming power also resides in this 
danger of losing Being: “But where danger is, grows the saving power also” – Hölderlin 
(Heidegger 1977, p. 28). Here a Turning (Kehre) takes place, since “it is technology itself 
that makes the demand on us to think in another way what is usually understood by 
“essence” (Heidegger 1977, p. 30). What this means is that technology is primarily a 
method, a mediation, between us and the world. Basically, this mediation can never be the 
essence, since mediation happens in between being and beings. So, since technology is 
mediating, it cannot be the essence of itself. The believe in technology as its essence is 
what is dangerous. Yet, apparently, Heidegger is in no way against technology as such, but 
  
2 Interestingly, Levinas most important critique on Heidegger was on the notion of Heidegger’s 
supposed egological ontology, in favor of a fundamental ethics. Here, however, Heidegger does 
not seem to be in favor of egological thinking. 
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only warns us for its danger. How does the Turning, toward seeing that technology does 
not equal its essence, come to pass then? How can we be redeemed from this mistake? 
The answer to this question lies in the Greek definition of the essence as enduring, as we 
explored on page 70. This enduring is granted to man by enframing, since that which has a 
(more or less) stable frame needs to (more or less) endure. The question concerning 
technology is important, first of all, because of the enduring of technology. Technology is 
not something which comes and goes: since the beginning of time, when man used tools 
to hunt and gather, technology has been a hiding-coming-to-presence of Being. In other 
words, technology has always hidden the fact that it needs to be used when it is used: 
when we are using a spoon, for instance, we do not care to think about how uncanny it is 
that our hand “fits” the spoon. We simply use the spoon. So, whatever else we can explain 
about technology, it endures because of how normal it is, or, in other words, because of its 
enframing character. Heidegger's exploration is a questioning of what exactly makes 
technology endure. The answer to this question is simply Being. The danger then lies in the 
hiding of Being through technology: the danger is that by using technology, we forget 
that the essence of this use is not located in technology, but in our relationship with 
technology. The redeeming power lies in figuring out about that uncanny relationship, 
while continuing to use technology. Heidegger primarily calls on us to stay observant of 
the danger, in the mode of aesthetic reply, to make sure that man is truly given to himself 
and not to some practical goal, while at the same time realizing that man's aim toward 
practical goals is what makes it possible to experience it differently and freely. 
 An important remark needs to be made concerning the nature of existential 
philosophy. One might think that to be conscious of the danger is the right way to be 
saved from harm. Yet being conscious would not be a valid way of dealing with the danger, 
since consciousness is not in fact something which has a certain tradition: it appears to be 
something metaphysical. A consciousness is called into existence which has the ability to 
judge. This consciousness is a perceived singularity, while there actually is no such thing. 
Being happens in the relation between what is – near.  Poiesis however, is something 
aesthetic, which means that is has to do with seeing, hearing and feeling (perhaps smelling 
as well). This seeing, hearing and feeling is what makes time so important in what we call 
existence, since it is only possible to see, hear and feel something, in a particular discourse, 
in a particular time. Aesthetic judgment is the ordering forth (enframing) of ourselves to 
look for and listen to the ordering forth of ourselves in reality. In other words, aesthetics 
makes us ready to find that which has been made ready. This might be where 
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Kierkegaard's true choice really lies: It is obviously absurd to be made ready to search for 
the readymade reality in the world. Being made ready for use is a concept of enframing. 
Since this enframing is a matter of external goals, we can ask what would be the external 
goal in experiencing reality being made ready? There cannot be one, since it falls outside of 
the inner workings of technology, while at the same time being driven by technological 
enframing itself. It is absurd, yet is there another – better – choice? Does not the aesthetic 
inside existentialism command us to listen to Being? Can there be any other goal? We thus 
ask ourselves whether the Nietzschean Will to Power is so absent from Heidegger's 
existentialism. It seems that a Will to Power orders us into making things ready, even if we 
escape the danger of practical technology. How would Heidegger have written his books, 
if not ordered by Being? 
 This leads us to another question, namely the question of why Heidegger did not 
write, as Levinas suggested, a more ethical – metaphysical – work (Levinas 1969, A4 “Met-
aphysics Precedes Ontology”). Heidegger's ethics, apparently contradictory, lie in his aes-
thetics: It is when seeing with our eyes and listening with our ears for those moments 
when Being reveals itself (in technology near us), that we will be able to catch its hiding. 
Yet, when attempting to catch Being as it hides itself, we are always too late. Being is al-
ready hidden from us, before we can even catch onto its hiding. As far as I am concerned, 
this is exactly why Heidegger did not write an ethical-procedural work, or why ethical 
works in general are less valuable than often, practically, thought. I would argue that ethi-
cal works do not recognize that they come after the fact; they presuppose an open space 
where there is room for us to think about ethics. Yet, we are too late for that, technology 
has already hidden existence from us and thinking otherwise is actually an enframed way 
of hiding Being. This is the setting Heidegger is in. When man keeps an eye on the dangers 
at all times, a possibility opens up in the future for man to safeguard Being by revealing 
technology's working. This might seem to be an ethical “eye”, yet I would argue that it is 
primarily an (normative) aesthetic matter, a matter of sensing and not a matter of theoriz-
ing about that normativity. 
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5.7 Technè 
 
 In the previous section, we discovered that both the danger and the redeeming 
power of our modern time are located in enframing. The danger would be the mindless 
acceptance of the supposed usability of modern technology as the grounding frame of 
our time. Note that mindless also refers to intelligent people, since the designation 
“intelligent” already refers to the “enframed human”. The redeeming power lies in the 
truth about technology in terms of poiesis. Poiesis refers to the artist's way of guiding 
something into existence which harbors a certain aesthetic view on life (a painting, for 
instance), instead of forcefully creating something efficient and practical. Surprisingly, 
the ancient Greeks called both poiesis and praxis technè. Just like the difference 
between the Dionysian and the Apollonian, there does not appear to be a clear -cut, 
real-life, distinction between poiesis and praxis. This is why, eventually, there can only 
be redeeming power where there is danger and vice versa. 
 As we explained, Heidegger proposes a different way of dealing with technological 
modernity. Next to this, he does not only offer this way, he writes this way: It permeates 
his language. This is the meaning of the ancient Greek word of technè in its supposed 
original meaning. Technè does not only refer to the technological praxis, but also to a 
technological poiesis, which is the aesthetic part of technology. This aesthetic possibility is 
opened up when we are astounded: Through everything technological, the essence of 
technology – which is nothing technological – might come to reveal itself. The more 
immanent the danger of hiding Being in favor of practical exercises is, the more powerful 
the aesthetic force to be astounded by the revealed saving power becomes. This is what 
Heidegger means by art. The job of the artist in the broadest sense is then to first lay the 
groundwork for thinking and experiencing the essence of Being and to prepare the road 
which is – often – blocked by enframing (Heidegger 1977, p. 40). Now, if Heidegger would 
pose anything as destructive, it would be the dominance of a practical interpretation of 
technology. This dominance is what, according to Heidegger, constitutes modernity as an 
era. Most of us live our life in the shadow of the ghost in the machine, accepting a certain 
set of values or regulation as natural and unthought laws. We are constantly pulled by this 
dominance of one side of technè: It is our only understanding of the nearness which 
surrounds us, losing Being in the process. Yet, the poietic side of technè should not be 
seen as an antidote for the loss of Being. The poietic might seem more important than 
praxis, simply because in our time, the poietic is nearly disregarded as a valid mode to 
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Being. This is so, because we often require scientific argumentation to support poietic 
views, after which we are surprised when the aesthetic cannot give proper scientific 
arguments for its revealing of Being, while the rest of reality appears to conform to the 
status quo of capitalism and practical order. 
 The poietic does not allow itself to be commanded like that. It does not require any 
outside change, except an existential turning in the responsibility of the subject in its 
relation to Being. When this happens, the world changes, because our understanding of 
language changes. The aesthetic-poietic is not nearly enough for this to happen however, 
just like the practical and rational would not be enough. The true redeeming power lies a 
presupposition in technology as destining: it lies in an opening up of human's relation to 
himself, which in our time is revealed by a poietic understanding of technology, simply 
because the poietic is the alternative method necessary for us to have a deeper relation to 
our Being compared to the superficial and fast relationship of praxis. In other words, the 
poietic reveals that it is our destiny to define ourselves as our relationship with technology, 
in this modern time. 
 To summarize, the poietic and enframing are not opposites. Although enframing 
might aim for total dominion of the private and public realm, it will never be able to keep 
this aim going, since it will simply be observed in its attempts to dominate. This observing, 
that is the poietic, disarms the enframing praxis. Yet, the poietic needs a frame in order to 
reveal anything, because, as we saw, poiesis always arrives when enframing has already 
started. Still, the two are not actually distinct, since it is only the one movement of Being 
which has any meaning whatsoever. This one movement of Being lies in the fact that it 
hides and while it hides, it is discovered. Being is the third observer in a game of hide-and-
seek, who knows exactly where someone hid, because it did not close its eyes when the 
seeker was counting. Being needs the game in order to reveal the hiding, while at the 
same time breaking the enframing of the game where one is not allowed to peek. The 
danger would be an everlasting game of hide-and-seek, where no one can find the one 
who hid, yet they ceaselessly try to stay within the limits of the game to do so. Being 
brings about destiny, in the sense that it can experience the hiding places where it is hid-
den. 
98 
5.8 Thought as Catalyst 
 
 As Heidegger's critique mainly addresses the metaphysical tendency to enframe 
the world as thought-experiments, he opens another definition of thought. In the pre-
vious section, we saw that, essentially, there is no difference between poiesis and 
praxis. The difference “only” resides in how we see, feel and think (and thus enframe). 
In this sense, thought becomes something less central than we are used to. During 
metaphysical times, thought was generally seen as more important than feeling. I a l-
ready analyzed Nietzsche's critique on thought and how feeling is an essential part of 
the enframing as well. Although thought might still be very important in Heidegger's 
philosophy, real thought (meaning thought from outside of the frame, unto the frame) 
happens from the periphery. 
 The Turning we mentioned before is a turning in and towards thinking. In a part of 
the NESKE Documentary, Heidegger made the clearest analogy: one does not need to 
know the exact workings of technology and science to be able to operate, say, a television. 
In the same way, one does not need to be able to know how to think to be able to think 
(http://youtu.be/9_vYz4nQUcs 4:20). Yet, knowing how to think allows us to be free-
standing to what we think about. This is a freedom metaphysics never had, since it was 
mainly focused on perfecting the system of metaphysics, yet did not know what the 
essence of the system was. Basically, in our obvious use of a microwave oven, we are 
metaphysicians, expecting technology to work as it works without any knowledge of the 
essence of our use. 
 The Turning towards knowing how to think moves from the entrapment of Being in 
oblivion towards the safekeeping of Being near us, at home. The turning refers to an 
understanding of what we are doing locally, in contrast with a knowing what happens in 
the abstraction of a metaphysical idea. It is something which astounds, like we saw, 
because it happens suddenly and unexpectedly. The turning in thought cannot be 
predicted in any way, since it is so heavily dependent on whatever and whenever Being 
lights up. Yet, I would argue that an opening up through poiesis invites this Turning: when 
we emphasize poietically bringing something into Being, we take a coaching attitude 
towards whatever reveals itself to us: we become catalysts of Being. Thought can never be 
mine alone, since language is not essentially mine either. It is only possible to coach 
something else into existence on a shared foundation of experience. This shared 
foundation of experience is Being, that which is near to us and reveals itself to us as 
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technology. This nearness, Being, is nothing more than our interest and stake in what is 
close to us. We can only coach something into existence when we care about that 
something or someone. I would argue that caring, by definition, can only happen to things 
which are close to our experience. 
 The turning from enframing toward the (in my words) coaching-poietic is an 
invitation into the workings of thought. The thorough investigation of technological 
methods (science) cannot reveal it, since that only leads to a practical investigation. It can 
only be discovered through a glance. It is this almost minimalistic glance, in which the truth 
– the uncovering process – and Being emerges. So, what exactly happens in the glance? A 
glance is never a straight investigation with all the enframing tools of research at our 
disposal. Rather a glance happens from a corner, towards the center – where “things 
happen”. Yet, the people in the center are closely working with the specific thing, while a 
glance from the corner has absolutely no effect in technological sense. So, because of this 
glance, the thing recovers its right to stand before us as object, impassable, instead of as 
usable tool. The thing cannot demand us to come forward and join its discourse, when we 
do not approach it from an enframing perspective. Enframing is the enemy of the glance, 
because it does not only disguise the impassable Object as usable thing, it even disguises 
this very disguising. Enframing is a meta-disguising, in a way. Thinking, for Heidegger, 
means renouncing the purely rational human. Rather it consists of projecting oneself 
towards the insight of coming-to-pass, of the revealing of truth, of genuine questioning 
from an independent point of view, through a poietic coaching. 
 When we talk about thinking in this way, we talk about thinking as questioning. 
Actually, we talk about thinking being questioning. Questioning is not a metaphor of 
thinking (questioning as thinking), but questioning is the most original method of thinking, 
in the mode of language. Similarly, Nietzsche posed that originally language constructed 
concepts and later science took over that part (Nietzsche 1879 , p. 21). Yet, for Heidegger, 
this is not exactly true, since the construction of concepts comes from the original 
questioning: A turning of what language hides (essence), so instead it gets to reveal this 
essence in more original language, the language from the glance in the corner. Although 
we explored Heidegger's critique of Nietzsche in the first chapter of this part, I am still 
suspicious of Heidegger's fundamental founding of a more original question, namely the 
question concerning Being, mostly because Nietzsche sometimes seems to be suspicious 
about knowing in general. When we return to the writing of Nietzsche, we read the 
following: 
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Rather, it is human, and only its possessor and begetter takes it so solemnly-as though the 
world's axis turned within it. But if we could communicate with the gnat, we would learn that 
he likewise flies through the air with the same solemnity, that he feels the flying center of the 
universe within himself. There is nothing so reprehensible and unimportant in nature that it 
would not immediately swell up like a balloon at the slightest puff of this power of knowing. 
And just as every porter wants to have an admirer, so even the proudest of men, the 
philosopher, supposes that he sees on all sides the eyes of the universe telescopically focused 
upon his action and thought. (Nietzsche 1879, p. 8) 
 
It almost appears as if Heidegger's more fundamental way of thinking is based on 
Nietzsche's insights in the fundamental power plays within the act of knowing. Now the 
question becomes whether Heidegger's revelation is another mode, outside of the power 
of knowing, or whether it feigns to complicate the enframing discourse in order to gain 
power. Is Heidegger's existentialism truly the herald of a new era, a modern era in which 
we think Being more original than ever before? Perhaps it is. The beauty of Nietzsche's 
thinking is that he clearly investigates the construction of knowledge in a non-moral sense. 
Nietzsche himself opened up the realm of truth with this investigation, for anyone to 
construct a crown and throne for his or her own knowledge-expertise. In one way, 
Heidegger “merely” tried to hold it all together, to, as he himself says, destine Western 
contemporary evening-thinking toward a new future, a future which was nearly destroyed 
with the end of metaphysics. Doing this, he takes his distance from Nietzsche, in order to 
be able to create a free-standing discourse and not a temple to the man before him, 
Nietzsche. This free-standing discourse is clearly which influenced his analysis of the 
enframing praxis: Nietzsche's Will to Power is nothing if not practical in its working; even 
the stones and dirt are upheld by it. Yet, the Will to Power's goal lies outside it as well as 
inside. The most fundamental (existential) relation of man to himself would also be 
determined by Will to Power, in Nietzsche's philosophy. Yet, because Nietzsche 
investigated metaphysics so radically and deep, without turning away from it, Heidegger 
might have felt justified in turning away from it so radically. Metaphysics was done for, 
since it was questioned from within to its point of self-destruction. 
 However, Heidegger found that the essence of metaphysics was still not thought by 
Nietzsche. Nietzsche did not look from a free standing point towards metaphysics, as to 
determine its essence. He named himself a follower of Dionysus, so he dived right into the 
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debate of metaphysics. So, Nietzsche might not ever have thought existentially, as 
Heidegger posed (Heidegger 1977, p. 104); it is still the question whether Heidegger's 
interpretation of Nietzsche is entirely acceptable. Whether the most foolish or the most 
brilliant, one cannot escape a lust for power through knowledge. Existentialism, on the 
other hand, seems to disregard the importance and urgency of power-play in our world. 
Contrary, Heidegger hopes for a better time in which Being is more fundamentally 
experienced, a point of view which creates an extreme responsibility for the individual. 
Weirdly, Nietzsche might be seen as more at peace than Heidegger with the shadow side 
of reality, while he was the one who still clung on to a metaphysics, contrary to Heidegger. 
Nietzsche describes the road of the Will to Truth, which Heidegger seems to have adopted, 
integrated and used. Yet a Will to Truth – perhaps even Heidegger's truth as revealing – 
harbors the Will to Power. Nietzsche writes that it is imperative to make peace with the 
worst bellum omium contra omnes, in order to found the first of all truths, namely the 
terms of this peacemaking (Nietzsche 1879, p. 10). Before we can live, there need to be 
terms of peace. Peace is hereby a state of exception. The war which we are talking about is 
the war between the world and its image, between the unmovable Object and the made-
ready object. Because Nietzsche wrote about the destruction of metaphysics, Heidegger 
was in a position to make peace with the world, which had been leeched upon for so long 
by its forceful image. Heidegger made peace with the world by being more essential in his 
thinking, by which he created the distance he needed between the revealer of the death 
of god and the harbinger of the essential, Being. 
 It might sound counter-intuitive, but all these arguments are actually not 
arguments against Heidegger and his thinking, just like Heidegger's arguments about 
Nietzsche showing us the oblivion of Being is not an argument against Nietzsche. It seems 
that the hiding-coming-to-presence of Being inside Heidegger's own work might be a 
constructive hiding of Nietzsche's Will to Power, to focus on something which was yet 
obscured in Nietzsche. When one glances from the corner, one definitely does not see 
everything. But the concealment of Nietzsche in Heidegger's work needs to be uncovered, 
if we are to arrive at a truthful explanation of his existentialism. It is thus not quite as 
important that Heidegger disregarded certain other interpretations of Nietzsche, which 
might fit an existential approach better. The true suspicious and radical question 
Nietzsche would have asked Heidegger is whether or not Heidegger used valid language 
to make the unreal real, which is the criterion of a grasp for power (Nietzsche 1879, p. 10). 
Through his writing, Heidegger's tries to open up a different way of experiencing, namely 
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an experiencing beyond the ever affective limits of power, thereby powerfully recruiting 
us for the validity of his concepts in the future. But, it is a powerful recruiting in a different 
way, because the power works through an open invitation. Most people will not be 
touched by Heidegger's language, otherwise we would all be using poietic language on a 
daily basis. On the other hand, Nietzsche's Will to Power does touch everyone, at all times, 
at least according to the explanation of the concept. So perhaps, in being poietic, 
Heidegger really does glance from the corner and therefore needs to stay the exception in 
a world of power-accumulation. Perhaps there is no other way. 
 Heidegger's existentialism and the metaphysical language he employs make him 
appear a thinker of the sublime and infinite. Indeed, the possibility would exist that man is 
given to himself most fundamentally in this modern era, with every freedom that entails. 
To express this fundamental existential relation of man to himself in a coaching-poietic 
way is thus of the utmost important for people to understand their own ground. Yet this 
ground is not known to us yet. This simple fact makes our own ground not fully our own: 
There is a sense of the Other in us, we are not fully who we are. Basically, the Other in us 
means that the Will to Power indeed cannot be all-encompassing. Because, how would we 
know if it were? Nietzsche is obscure, even for himself, since he cannot touch this Other, 
yet still forces the Other inside his metaphysics of power-accumulation (Heidegger 1979, p. 
97). So, while Nietzsche's rejected Kant's thought-experiments of reason, his own thought-
experiments of metaphysics still last. So, does Heidegger allow this Other to be Other? In 
fact, it appears he does, namely in the concept of poiesis itself. Poiesis is a relating process, 
since the destining forth which is our responsibility is not something we can figure out by 
ourselves. It needs to happen near us, in a concrete situation, where there are Others as 
well. Although Being is a general concept, it is not a closed and final concept like the Will 
to Power is. The Will to Power is closed and finalized by the idea of Eternal Recurrence, 
which consists of a cyclical idea of time, instead of a linear. This cyclical idea entails the 
ever repeating and coming again of the Will to Power, meaning that the Will to Power 
cannot tire or change itself. Everything is an expression of the Will to Power and in that 
sense, everything will be again an expression of the Will to Power. Heidegger uses time as 
an opening and not as a closing, which allows the Other to reveal itself. “So long as we do 
not, through thinking, experience what is, we can never belong to what will be” 
(Heidegger 1979, p. 49) 
 We have seen how Heidegger aims for the coaching-revealing of the essence of an-
ything near us (the bringing about of the revelation of Being), contrary to an approach 
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which aims to create air castles which we can live by. This coaching-revealing happens from 
the periphery and not from the center, because the periphery allows one to escape being 
absorbed by the system. This system creates a center of practical effects. We also suspi-
ciously explored the possibility that the coaching-revealing from the corner is actually a 
new grasp for power instead of a true coaching. In other words, I asked whether one 
would be satisfied sitting in the corner, glancing, or whether the corner-glance is actually a 
renewed effort to create a center and banish the process of enframing to the corner. Yet, 
because the coaching-revealing is a relational method, its essence lies in the relation be-
tween the enframing and the revelation of what the enframing actually is by relating it to 
a glancing person in the corner.  
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5.9 Pictures and Worlds 
 
 So, the redefinition of thought tends to view the enframing process from the 
periphery, in order to reveal the enframing itself. The truth which we eventually di s-
covered, is the truth about the world. “Before”, the world was flat and round, yet it 
was an Object on which we lived and which gave us an eternal foundation; it was not 
possible to exclude our location on the earth in our existence. At this moment, howe v-
er, the earth is enframing as well, namely enframing as a picture; we travel the world 
and enframe the places we visit by taking pictures. Apocalyptic movies, air planes and 
social media also contribute to the enframing of the earth as a picture. These pictures 
are ready to use; the world with its cultures changes from grand Object to exhibition.  
 The change which comes in modern time is the enframing by technology of the 
world as picture. What does this mean, the world as picture? First of all, Heidegger tells us, 
we should not be too quick in interpreting picture as some sort of copy or print of the 
world. Rather, world picture means the “world conceived and grasped as picture” 
(Heidegger 1979, p. 129). In this sense, we cannot say that there also was a medieval 
picture of the world, or a Greek picture of the world. These times simply did not grasp the 
world as picture, because in those time subjectivity was not developed as much as it is now. 
The subject was not the ground of its relations to objects in the world: rather, there were 
external structures which were grounded in other, absolute authorities, like God, the 
Church, the City-State et cetera. Now, however, the subject becomes the absolute 
authority. The subject has become so stable, it can “carry” the entire world, but only as 
“image”. 
 The first fundamental event which led to the world picture lies in its 
(mathematically oriented) science, which feeds the autonomous enframing of machine 
technology as second distinct fundamental event (Heidegger 1979, p. 116). Modern times 
are, as we saw, no longer grounded in metaphysics. Rather the quest for technology leads 
us to a scientific exploration of nature within history. The most important insight of 
Heidegger’s on this point seems to be that research is not something which is constructed 
through experimenting. “Rather, on the contrary, experiment first becomes possible 
where and only where the knowledge of nature has been transformed into research.” 
(Heidegger 1979, p. 121), meaning, that the transformation of knowledge of nature into 
research is the ground of the experiment. The modern era gives birth to sciences like bio-
politics and bio-hermeneutics because of the fact that nature within history is the common 
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ground in all research. Also, a huge amount of entirely new communities are being created 
in a digital sense, thanks to the ongoing enframing of nature. Because of this, “every place 
is equal” (Heidegger 1979, p. 119). Perception on the internet has nothing to do with real 
location. This makes science an ongoing project to methodologically map more and more 
territory of nature, while simultaneously posing differentiated territory as its own 
(Heidegger 1979, p. 126). What this means is that science is claiming more and more of 
nature, while assigning what it finds in the process to different “new” parts of science. The 
immediate goal of this process of science is freeing man to himself, although only in a 
superficial sense. The reason for this superficiality is that man forgets one thing: His 
essence changed at some point, he became subject (subiectum, hypokeimenon) 
(Heidegger 1979, p. 128) and establishes a relation to the world, thereby picturing the 
world as modern contra picturing a specific demarcated place as a (i.e.) kingdom in 
medieval times. A king has a limited amount of land, yet he has also a far-reaching 
authority, sometimes granted by a metaphysical idea like God. Now however, our ground 
(subjectness) is not dependent on place anymore. In modern times, we perfected the 
foundation as a mobile home, the subject. In this sense, man is a caravan. In this, the world 
as locus is what makes the picture modern. However, the meaning of locus is 
fundamentally destroyed, since world and locus are contradictory: A locus is always local, 
the world is always global, but apparently this is not the case. 
 Science ongoingly secures its methodology over nature and history, which are 
hence objects in research (Heidegger 1979, p. 125). Heidegger summarizes the essence of 
modern science: 
“Modern science simultaneously establishes itself and differentiates itself in its projections 
of specific object-spheres. These projection-plans are developed by means of a 
corresponding methodology, which is made secure through rigor. Methodology adapts 
and establishes itself at any given time in ongoing activity. Projection and rigor, 
methodology and ongoing activity, mutually requiring one another, constitute the essence 
of modern science, transform science into research.” (Heidegger 1979, p. 126) 
The decisive element for a turning towards a coaching-revealing mood is that the very 
essence of man changes and hence, man becomes subject. This subject is first of all a 
metaphysical concept and has no relation whatsoever to man or to the I. It rather means 
that man becomes the being on which everything is grounded: Man becomes ground as it 
observes the manner of its Being. Man becomes “the relational center of that which is as 
such” (Heidegger 1979, p. 128), putting man into the center of all relating science does. 
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The movement of subjectivity appears to draw all “matter” (as “that which matters”, 
“meaning”) to itself and into the world. 
 The real turning event occurs where art moves into the scope of aesthetics, which 
means that art can be subjectively experienced and thus, becomes a valid expression of 
human life. Does this mean that the aesthetic in both Kierkegaard’s and Nietzsche’s vision 
had nothing to do with art itself, since the real was not founded on the subject in that time? 
(Heidegger 1979, p. 116) In any case, it does seem that when we talk about modern art, 
we talk about a different kind of art than the arts before modernity. Before modernity, 
the function of art was to provide an image of nature, for whatever goal. Schopenhauer, 
for instance, saw art as necessary for humans to temporarily escape the cruelty of the Will 
to Life. In his concept of art, the Will could be glanced in all its destructiveness and 
because of this the Will could be objectified and observed in calmness. Art was almost an 
escapist's notion, through which we could organize nature and revel in our power over it 
or freedom from it. Schopenhauer's vision of art was adopted by Nietzsche with the only 
difference that Nietzsche did not use art to escape nature, but to enhance culture as the 
humanization of nature and the naturalization of human. The modern kind of art is 
different because it seems to attempt to provide a different perspective of the process of 
enframing. Because of this, simply placing a urinal on its side is a form of modern art: 
Normally a urinal is enframed as part of a toilet system, which has the enframed praxis of 
deposing our bodily waste. Turning it on its side is absurd, from an enframing way of 
thinking: It is not formed by the logic of practical use. It is not even art! Of course, 
enframing has no concept of art after Heidegger, since that concept is located in the 
connection of the poietic with the process of enframing itself. Seen from the enframed 
point of view, the pre-modern art is more artistic, simply because it functions as an image 
of the world and life, just like science. Yet, in modern art, a toilet on its side is quite literally 
a bridge between the enframing part of technè and the poietical part of technè, since the 
urinal is not enframed as a working toilet system anymore: It shows us the limits of 
technology and thus the limits of our own subjectivity as well, since we become astounded 
upon seeing this work of art, exclaiming: “But it has no use! ”Yet, this exclamation is also a 
sign of our tendency to enframe. 
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Marcel Duchamp's Fountaine (1917) 
 
 If we consider the possibility of modern art as a Will to Power, we soon experience 
its deficiency; Modern art has no practical meaning. Well, supposedly one can still use a 
toilet seat upside down, but that would be absurd, since we have regular toilets for our 
much more practical use. There is no use to art in the classical sense of power. Power in art 
does not flow top-down, nor does it flow bottom-up. The power of art lies in the astound-
ing effect of the poietical. It has the power to stop us for a moment from our tendency of 
forgetting ourselves while setting the world into our hand, to use. It shows us the day to 
day enframing by resisting that enframing. Yet, an aesthetic approach still works, it has an 
effect on us in its astounding effect. It is a turning of our daily mode of productivity and 
lets us experience our ground again, however fun, painful or ridiculous that may seem. Art 
is an essential opening up for Being to be experienced more fundamentally, and is there-
fore not limited by the traditional definition of “artist”. Its effect can be achieved in all 
fields of work and science, because, where the danger is, grows the saving power as well.  
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5.10 Summary and Conclusions on Heidegger 
 
 To recapitulate once more, I analyzed Kierkegaard's idea of enframing: the idea of 
Either/Or choices, which entails the way our reality is constantly being enframed. Kierke-
gaard's solution to the tragedy of this enframing lies in the concept of repentance: we 
should repent our partaking of enframing, by acknowledging our limits concerning meta-
physical matters. Kierkegaard still accepts the presence of a God though, since there has 
to be a being which is always right where we are wrong – and which is thus the origin of 
enframing, according to Kierkegaard. Nietzsche is disgusted by this idea, since it only 
serves to keep people limited and small by means of the Apollonian idea of right and 
wrong. Nietzsche reveals the Dionysian, the chaotic and ecstatic, as an essential part of life, 
which has been hidden throughout our history. 
 At the beginning of this chapter, I analyzed Heidegger's critique on Nietzsche, 
which is also a critique on the entire Western history. This critique signifies the foundation 
of Western (metaphysical) thinking as nihilistic. Nihilism signifies a constant movement in 
order to escape towards a metaphysical reality, which supposedly founds and transcends 
the real. Somehow, we cannot live in reality as it is; it is too much to bear. Even Nietzsche, 
in his disgust of metaphysics, did not actually have the power to let metaphysics go. 
Heidegger therefore, returns to the question concerning what is right in front of our eyes 
and our relationship with whatever is near. Nearness is opposed to metaphysics, in his phi-
losophy. In order to return home, as it were, he redefines truth as the unconcealment of 
what is actually happening in front of our eyes. It is this relationship between us and the 
objects around us in our modern times that he calls enframing. According to Heidegger, we 
are always occupied with attaching handles to whatever transcending object, feeling or 
idea there is. For as long as we remember, philosophy has been occupied with making ide-
as, objects and feelings usable. This is dangerous, according to Heidegger, since enframing 
actively excludes any non-practical way of relating and is eventually as self-destructive as 
metaphysics was before. Consider, for instance, capitalism as a process which is aimed at 
making everything about human existence usable in order to gain profit. The saving power 
is thus located in a truthful perspective on technology and how it attempts to capture us, 
as well as nature, inside its frame. This truthful perspective is what Heidegger calls the 
Turning. It is not a turning in the way we do things (since philosophy cannot bring about a 
practical change at this time), but in the way we see and think about things. This Turning 
allows the process of enframing to continue, without actually contributing to or joining it. 
109 
The Turning happens when one merely watches enframing take place. An excellent exam-
ple of this is Duchamp's Fountaine, in which we see a usable object (a toilet), turned on its 
side rendering it totally useless, while still harboring the enframing power, because there 
does not exist a toilet which is not usable.  
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6. Conclusion 
 
Uncanny Pictures: Ianus as the image of our society  
 
 Throughout this thesis we explored the question of enframing from different 
points of view. The specific mood out of which technology is problematized can be de-
scribed as suspicious. Nietzsche taught us to be suspicious of any system which claims dom-
inance, because it primarily attempts to control and exercise power. Kierkegaard warned 
us about life's eluding choices; life (or the idea of it) always wants us to make a choice, 
thereby exercising a power over us, which may lead to a suspension of choices altogether 
on the one hand, or an almost random choice of whatever seems to be best on the other 
hand. Kierkegaard's religious philosophy was already the prelude to the binary world we 
live in today (Either/Or – 0/1 – on/off). Eventually, Heidegger alerts us about sweet-talk, 
which is meant to hide the falseness of the binary demands of the Either/Or, while it at-
tempts to enclose us in the process. The danger of our time then lies in the grasp enfram-
ing has on us and through which the world is structured. This structuring happens through 
any method which is reasonable, calculable, measurable, mathematical, scientific or (in 
short) technological. Yet, enframing also happens by means of feelings, as the Will to 
Power shows us; feelings are technological as well, since one can predict or agree on how 
certain happenings make someone feel So it appears that we should not allow ourselves 
to be caught in any system. In fact, it might be best to keep away, as far as we can, from 
the destructiveness of technologies and feelings alike, in a Schopenhauerian quietism3. 
Although I would consider this quietism as one option, it is still a lacking one, since it tends 
to disengage with society and reality in a fulfilling human way. Quietism is still a metaphys-
ical escape from an Either/Or world, since one perceives the enframing as purely destruc-
tive and forcing. 
 It stands to reason that Nietzsche's resurrection of the Dionysian happens in rebel-
lion against the all-inclusive power of the Apollonian. However much Dionysus and Apollo 
are like Ianus – two sides of the same coin – there has to be a fight, when reclaiming the 
domain of Apollo for Dionysus. Contrary to this fight, Heidegger's concept of truth (alèthe-
ia), is not a concept of fighting, but of showing, of revealing. Yet, when reading and inter-
preting Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche, I cannot escape the impression that 
  
3 Arthur Schopenhauer was in favor of pessimistic quietism, the idea that “playing the game” of life 
as we know it (politically, socially, emotionally, et cetera) can only lead to suffering. Instead, we 
should attempt to silence our desires through asceticism.  
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Heidegger is aggressive toward Nietzsche, because he reduces him to a metaphysical 
thinker from a pre-modern time. Actually though, Heidegger's writing and language also 
exhibit elements of the Will to Power; he does not just speak his mind, he does so in heavy 
metaphysical language. In order to understand Heidegger, one must struggle with his lan-
guage, while his language establishes a hold on the reader. Yet, Heidegger would probably 
never dare to suggest that he would be better than other philosophers in a time in which 
enframing is perceived of as tremendously important. Heidegger cannot offer the solution, 
but only a beginning. So, the warlike attitude of a dualistic approach in thought (Either/Or, 
Dionysus/Apollo, praxis/poiesis), is not something I would immediately discredit as pre-
modern.  
 My question would then be: what is being fought for in this war? In other words, 
who is the enemy and are we fighting the correct enemy? As we saw, the Apollonian was 
never the enemy, because it is merely a psychological category which simply cannot exist 
without the Dionysian. Nietzsche showed us that the death of God does not mean the 
death of the place of God. So, what is the Dionysian fighting? What is Heidegger's truth 
revealing? Is it the system itself or the effects of the system? Notice that this question is 
posed in the Either/Or function as well. Again, we are confronted by the need to make a 
choice, while this choice is – actually – meaningless. There is no way to rebel against the 
system, since rebelling means accepting the power of the system (as true) against which 
we fight.  
 In another respect, the choice (either/or) is the most meaningful choice one can 
make. Heidegger showed us that we should not forget our Being – meaning whatever is 
close by, in contrast to far away. Heidegger then, actively makes the choice for the ethic 
Kierkegaard prescribed: one should choose the local life, since, whatever we see, is before 
our eyes. Our mood is always a local mood, even when confronted with far-away impulses 
through the internet. To deal with what is close by however, Heidegger seems to need 
Kierkegaard's repentance in order to escape his one-sided interpretation of Nietzsche. I 
would argue that, in order to escape a warlike attitude and truly reveal (from out of the 
periphery), it is necessary to repent for the time (in the past and future) where truth did 
not mean unconcealment, but certainty.  
 
“Everything functions. That is exactly what is uncanny.”  (Heidegger 1966, p.11) 
 
 In terms of a conclusion about technological structuring seen through the eyes of 
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Kierkegaard, Nietzsche and Heidegger, this is an immense, yet simple, conclusion. “Think-
ing can do nothing more than to help humans to this insight [the dominance of enframing, 
KP], and philosophy is at an end” (idem).  Thinking and knowing, as in philosophy, do not 
and cannot occupy the place of God anymore. The three philosophers made sufficiently 
clear that thinking, in a sense, is enframing of reality as well. Thinking cannot occupy the 
place analytical philosophy claims it to. Hence, to conclude something Big would be disas-
trous, since it would have close to no relationship to the world as we experience it nowa-
days, namely the world as a picture. We passed the time that thought, just like music, 
could have a unifying effect. To achieve something unifying in thought would nevertheless 
be disastrous, since then the specific system of thought would function, yet there would 
be no space for it to be uncanny. In my opinion, this is not only undesirable, but even im-
possible. Yet... was it ever possible to achieve a unity between thought and reality? Or was 
it merely thought that it would be possible to achieve unity between thought and reality? 
This achievement of unity itself is impossible. So, what is the danger, exactly? The danger 
lies merely in the thought and assumption that this unity would be achieved some day. If I 
dare make any prediction about the future, it would be that there will never be any true 
unity or any true progress toward a time in which man recognizes himself as the shepherd 
of Being. Yet, to strive for such a time (a time beyond enframing and dualism) is essential 
to human existence. 
 Eventually, the Either/Or, the Dionysian, the Will to Power and the Turning are con-
cepts used to understand what is happening with us and/in reality. The power of these 
insights exists in the changing of perceptions instead of a forceful enframing of reality. 
The Either/Or shows us how the enframing demands a binary choice from us, whether to 
use this technology or to use that technology. Yet it appears as if the use is given; the spe-
cific choice is only suspended in expectation. Similarly, the Dionysian does not exist with-
out the Apollonian. The suspension which is given here is that there would be an Apolloni-
an, technologically enframing dominance in any given discourse, which can never be the 
case. Yet, this technological dominant frame might only be pronounced and believed in 
the discourse. Here, as well, it is a matter of temporary suspension from the Either/Or 
which, in fact, allows the enframing of the Either/Or to continue working. This is exactly 
what is meant by poiesis in the Turning; it is defined by the enframing-revealing experi-
ence of the uncanny fact that, in the center things always work, one way or the other. Yet, 
when this function is seen from a sideward glance, the binary choice which is requested of 
us – either get in the system or get out – is very uncanny. If not for this uncanny feeling, 
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enframing would be totalitarian. To understand technological enframing and to provide a 
foundation for new acting in the practical sense, there is no need to stop enframing, since 
there will always be moments that the following, as ontological condition of the mood 
“uncannyness”, is true: Nothing functions. Eventually, “everything functions” is revealed 
to be equal in truth to “nothing functions” (the two sides of Ianus), since one can only feel 
uncanny when one is, simultaneously, “in the picture” (repenting in order to stay in the 
picture; Apollonian) and “out of the picture” (ek-static; Dionysian). An example of this 
would be the photographer, who is simultaneously the condition to the picture he just 
took while not being printed on the picture at all. The photographer is simultaneously in-
cluded and excluded in the making of the picture. 
 In some ways, this is a new definition of the concept of enframing; a concept which 
tries to make peace with our technological advancement, while at the same time recogniz-
ing that this technological advancement is a totalitarian act. Yet, in speaking about techno-
logical advancement (from an outside perspective like the arts), its totalitarian aspect is 
diffused. I would give an example of this diffusion by saying that the much heralded scien-
tific progress and development of our time is a tendency which can never be ground-
breaking, revolutionary and new, however much it claims to be just that. Rather, paradoxi-
cally, the ground-breaking effects can only be found in repenting for our content-based 
technological extremism and instead relating to the old; to the “prehistoric” darkness of 
what Nietzsche would call the Dionysian. Naturally, this does not mean the destruction of 
a sub-culture of technology. Yet, this technological sub-culture, as well as the “prehistoric” 
darkness, both need to be recognized for what they are in our time: Images of splendor 
and failing, as the two faces of Ianus, true and uncanny at the same time. 
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Further Research 
Only a god can still save us 
 Heidegger made this proclamation, after explaining that philosophy, as well as any 
other human endeavor cannot bring about a direct change in the world (Heidegger, Spie-
gel interview p 11). At this time of decline, he argued, people will begin missing the absent 
God. People who decline the necessity of this God, decline the fact that they are always 
wrong in the face of the absent God. The resemblance to Kierkegaard's repentance is clear: 
Kierkegaard thought the true choice for one's self requires a repentance for our being 
wrong in the face of God. What is missed, according to Heidegger, is the directness of 
change a god could provide. A god could justify our repentance, could let us choose for 
ourselves and avert even greater tragedies. Yet, a god does not seem viable, perhaps be-
cause this generation missed the intensity of the direct experience of World War II, which 
Heidegger had. A question which would be very interesting to research would be: what 
happens to our metaphysical questions when there is no god? How does this god relate to 
nihilism?  
 Obviously, philosophy did not stop after Heidegger. The post-structuralist philo-
sophical discourse of Deleuze and many others4, rely heavily on Nietzsche and Heidegger 
as “teachers”. They continue to produce philosophy, even when Heidegger's opinion was 
that philosophy would come to an end. Gilles Deleuze, for example, expresses Nietzsche's 
Will to Power as “the differential and genetic element” of force, in order to show that Nie-
tzsche did not think of the Will to Power as a unitary element, like Schopenhauer did with 
his Will to Life. The Will to Power is differential in nature, which implies differences in the 
level of power of those different expressions of the Will to Power. How exactly the differ-
ent expressions relate to each other, in terms of power, is subject to genetic structure; 
changes in identity are determined by fluctuations in the level of power (Deleuze 1962, p. 
57). Reading this post-structural philosophy, Heidegger's need for a new God seems rather 
superfluous. Apparently, power also effects reality without a God, through a dislocated 
differential with genetic qualities. Next to this, it should be said that the majority of the 
people in our world still believe in the existence of a metaphysical God. Yet, as Nietzsche 
and Heidegger aptly showed us, God has become an image in modernity, instead of an ab-
solute metaphysical structure. So, an urgent question of social importance seems to be 
  
4 For instance: Bataille's La peinture préhistorique, Derrida's Marges de la philosophy, Foucault's & 
Deleuze's Nietzsche as Genealogist and Nomade and Gadamer's Wahrheit und Methode, all analyze 
Nietzsche's and/or Heidegger's influence in the modern era. 
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the question concerning Heidegger's new and necessary God versus the God as an image 
in our current society. In other words, people seem to believe in a metaphysically struc-
tured God, while that kind of God cannot exist anymore in our world of images. How do 
we deal with this discrepancy?  
 As a final remark on this question, it appears that art took the place of God, at least 
in philosophy. Post-structural thinkers like Deleuze and Derrida have more in common with 
art than they do with religion. A final part of this question would therefore be: Is it possi-
ble that (in theory) Nietzsche's revitalization of the Dionysian in a world where religion is 
failing, was carried on by post-structural philosophers in and by means of modern art? 
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Abstract “Enframing Reality”  
Kevin Pijpers 
  
In my thesis, I will focus on the problem of technology, from an existential perspective. What this 
means is that my goal is to explore how we relate to technology, what kind of sentiments are part 
of our use of technology and how technology enframes our daily lives. In the first part I analyze 
Kierkegaard's thinking, as expressed in his magnus opus Either/Or. Thinking and acting in terms of 
either/or, which I call binary, define not only the digital world, but also the entire frame in which we 
exist in our modern world. Everywhere, we are called upon to choose between this or that, which 
seems to be part of an authentic choice, but not really. Inside the dogma of either/or, Kierkegaard 
says, choosing is not real choosing. In his view, we should repent for thinking that our false choices 
were real at any point. The only choice to make is the choice to open our eyes to the fact that our 
choices in terms of either this or that are always unauthentic choices. One needs religion in order to 
be able to recognize that one is wrong at all times. 
 The second part of my thesis is the bridge between Kierkegaard and Heidegger using Nie-
tzsche. Nietzsche, the final metaphysician, is important because of his extreme suspicion of reduc-
tionist and oppressive thinking within previous philosophies and religion. His suspicious philosophy 
enables us to understand the problem of technology better. It opens up Kierkegaard’s either/or 
and adds something else to it: the Dionysian, the concept of an inherent chaos, madness and ec-
stasy, which does not fit within the logic of either/or. Considering the problem of technology, the 
Dionysian seems to be the anti-technology. 
 I then analyze Heidegger's critique on Nietzsche in the final part of my thesis. However 
highly Heidegger regards Nietzsche, he still concludes that Nietzsche does not really transcend the 
either/or question, a question which Heidegger sees as unoriginal because of its metaphysical 
tendencies. I continue by revealing Heidegger's own concept of technological enframing, which he 
discovers because of his research on truth (alètheia). Heidegger redefines truth as the aesthetic 
concept of craftmanship, which appears to be an alternative to technological enframing.  
 As a conclusion, I will summarize and combine Kierkegaard's and Nietzsche's contributions 
to achieve a more complete understanding of the concept of enframing. I conclude with the 
statement that the much heralded scientific progress and development of our time is a tendency 
which can never truly be ground-breaking, revolutionary, or new, however much it claims to be just 
that. Rather, paradoxically, the ground-breaking effect can only be found in repenting for our con-
tent-based technological extremism by relating to the old, to the “prehistoric” darkness, of what 
Nietzsche calls the Dionysian. Naturally, this does not mean the destruction of a technological sub-
culture. Yet, the Dionysian “prehistoric” darkness finally puts technology in its place: a place in the 
periphery of life. 
